4 gesichtete, geschützte Fragmente: Plagiat
| [1.] Nm5/Fragment 414 20 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 5. February 2014, 10:41 WiseWoman Erstellt: 2. February 2014, 22:55 (Hindemith) | Fragment, Gesichtet, Han Kamber 2006, Nm5, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 414, Zeilen: 20-25 |
Quelle: Han_Kamber_2006 Seite(n): 560, 561, Zeilen: 560: last lines; 561: 1ff |
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| How can we mine terrorist networks? Traditional methods of machine learning and data mining, taking a random sample of homogeneous objects from a single relation as input, may not be appropriate. The data comprising terrorist networks tend to be heterogeneous, multi-relational, and semi-structured. IDM embodies descriptive and predictive modeling. By considering links (relationships between the entities), more information is made available to the mining process. | “How can we mine social networks?” Traditional methods of machine learning and data mining, taking, as input, a random sample of homogenous [sic] objects from a single
[page 561] relation, may not be appropriate here. The data comprising social networks tend to be heterogeneous, multirelational, and semi-structured.[...] It embodies descriptive and predictive modeling. By considering links (the relationships between objects), more information is made available to the mining process. |
The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. Also the formatting with italics is parallel. |
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| [2.] Nm5/Fragment 414 25 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 7. February 2014, 19:42 Hindemith Erstellt: 2. February 2014, 23:18 (Hindemith) | Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm5, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Svenson et al 2006, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 414, Zeilen: 25-31 |
Quelle: Svenson et al 2006 Seite(n): 3, Zeilen: 1ff |
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| Mathematical methods used in the research on IDM [12–15] are clearly relevant to intelligence analysis and may provide tools and techniques to discover terrorist networks in their planning phase and thereby prevent terrorist acts from being carried out. Relevant patterns to investigate include connections between actors (meetings, messages), activities of the involved actors (specialized training, purchasing of equipment), and information gathering (time tables, visiting sites).
12. Memon, N., Larsen H.L.: Practical approaches for analysis, visualization and destabilizing terrorist networks. In: The proceedings of ARES 2006: The First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, Vienna, Austria, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 906–913 (2006) 13. Memon, N., Larsen, H.L.: Practical algorithms of destabilizing terrorist networks. In the proceedings of IEEE Intelligence Security Conference, San Diego, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3976: pp. 398–411. Springer, Berlin (2006) 14. Memon, N., Larsen, H.L.: Detecting Terrorist Activity Patterns using Investigative Data Mining Tool. International Journal of Knowledge and System Sciences, 3(1), 43–52 (2006) 15. Memon, N., Qureshi, A.R.: Destabilizing terrorist networks. In WSEAS Transactions on Computers. 11(4), 1649–1656 (2005) |
Social network analysis methods are clearly relevant to law enforcement intelligence work and may provide tools to discover criminal networks in their planning phase and thereby prevent terrorist acts and other large-scale crimes from being carried out. Relevant patterns to investigate include connections between actors (meetings, messages), activities of the involved actors (specialized training, purchasing of equipment) and information gathering (time tables, visiting sites). |
The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. |
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| [3.] Nm5/Fragment 414 32 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 7. February 2014, 19:43 Hindemith Erstellt: 2. February 2014, 23:27 (Hindemith) | Fragment, Gesichtet, Koschade 2005, Nm5, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 414, Zeilen: 32-37 |
Quelle: Koschade 2005 Seite(n): 2, 3, Zeilen: 2: 6-8; 3: 31ff |
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| IDM offers the ability to firstly map a covert cell, and to measure the specific structural and interactional criteria of such a cell. IDM aims to connect the dots between individuals and map and measure complex, covert, human groups, and organizations. The methods focus on uncovering the patterns of interaction, and correctly interpreting these networks to predict behaviors and decision-making within the network. | Social network analysis offers the ability to firstly map a covert cell, and to secondly measure the specific structural and interactional criteria of such a cell.
[page 3] This framework aims to connect the dots between individuals and “map and measure complex, sometimes covert, human groups and organisations”.8 The method focuses on uncovering the patterning of people’s interaction,9 and correctly interpreting these networks assists “in predicting behaviour and decision-making within the network”.10 8 Krebs, V. (2002) “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells”, Connections, Vol. 24, 3, pp. 43-52. 9 Freeman, L. (nd) ‘The Study of Social Networks’, The International Network for Social Network Analysis, Retrieved May 17, 2004, from http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/INSNA/na_inf.html. 10 Renfro, R. & Deckro, R. (2001). “A Social Network Analysis of the Iranian Government”, paper presented at 69th MORS Symposium, 12-14 June, 2001, p. 4. |
The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. |
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| [4.] Nm5/Fragment 419 02 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 7. February 2014, 19:42 Hindemith Erstellt: 2. February 2014, 23:36 (Hindemith) | Fragment, Gesichtet, Katz et al 2004, Nm5, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 419, Zeilen: 2-20 |
Quelle: Katz et al 2004 Seite(n): 308, 309, Zeilen: 308: 23ff; 309: 1ff |
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| In the social network literature, researchers have examined a broad range of types of ties [19]. These include communication ties (such as who talks to whom or who gives information or advice to whom), formal ties (such as who reports to whom), affective ties (such as who likes whom, or who trusts whom), material or work flow ties (such as who gives bomb making material or other resources to whom), and proximity ties (who is spatially or electronically close to whom). Networks are typically multiplex, that is, actors share more than one type of tie. For example, two terrorists might have a formal tie (one is a foot-soldier or a newly recruited person in the terrorist cell and reports to the other, who is the cell leader) and an affective tie (they are friends); and may also have a proximity tie (they are residing in the same apartment and their flats are two doors away on the same floor).
Network researchers have distinguished between strong ties (such as family and friends) and weak ties such as acquaintances [9, 10]. This distinction will involve a multitude of facets, including affect, mutual obligations, reciprocity, and intensity. In information flow, the strong ties are particularly valuable when an individual seeks socio-emotional support and often entail a high level of trust. Weak ties are more valuable when individuals are seeking diverse or unique information from someone outside their regular frequent contacts. 9. Granovetter, M.: The Strength of Weak Ties. Am. J. Sociol. 81, 1287–1303 (1973) 10. Granovetter, M.: The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. In: Collins, R.(ed.) Sociological Theory, pp. 105–130 (1982) 19. Monge, P.R., Contractor, N.: Theories of Communication Networks. Oxford University Press, New York (2003) |
Network researchers have examined a broad range of types of ties. These include communication ties (such as who talks to whom, or who gives information or advice to whom), formal ties (such as who reports to whom), affective ties (such as who likes whom, or who trusts whom), material or work flow ties (such as who gives money or other resources to whom), proximity ties (who is spatially or electronically close to whom), and cognitive ties (such as who knows who knows whom). Networks are typically mutiplex [sic], that is, actors share more than one type of tie. For example, two academic colleagues might have a formal tie (one is an assistant professor and reports to the other, who is the department chairperson)
[page 309] and an affective tie (they are friends) and a proximity tie (their offices are two doors away). Network researchers have distinguished between strong ties (such as family and friends) and weak ties (such as acquaintances) (Granovetter, 1973, 1982). This distinction can involve a multitude of facets, including affect, mutual obligations, reciprocity, and intensity. Strong ties are particularly valuable when an individual seeks socioemotional support and often entail a high level of trust. Weak ties are more valuable when individuals are seeking diverse or unique information from someone outside their regular frequent contacts. Granovetter,M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 81, 1287-1303. Granovetter,M. (1982). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. In R. Collins (Ed.), Sociological theory 1983 (pp. 105-130). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. |
The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. The authors of the paper substitute here "terrorists" for "academic colleagues" and correspondingly "foot-soldier" for "assistant professor" and "cell leader" for "department chairperson". |
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