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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 101, Zeilen: 17-31 |
Quelle: Flinders Buller 2005 Seite(n): 6, 7, 8, 10, Zeilen: 6: 2ff; 7: 15ff; 8: 8ff; 10: 10ff |
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| Institutional depoliticization is possibly the most frequently employed tactic. A formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former (minister) sets broad policy parameters while the latter (chief executive) enjoys day-to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set by ministers. Institutional depoliticization is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some extent from short-term political considerations - vote seeking, populist, short-term pressures to which elected politicians are subject (Buller and Flinders, 2005). Ministers do, however, enjoy substantial powers in relation to nationalised industries over such issues as appointments, policy frameworks and investment. Thus, a distinction needs to be made between an organisation‟s theoretical autonomy and the autonomy it enjoys in practice. Depoliticization should not therefore be seen as necessarily part of the „hollowing out‟ or evisceration of the state but may be more accurately be interpreted as an aspect of the transformation of the state. Moreover, the degree of true „depoliticization‟ is questionable when the independent body operates within a frequently narrow and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers. | Institutional depoliticisation is possibly the most frequently employed tactic. A formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former (minister) sets broad policy parameters while the latter (chief executive) enjoys day-to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set by ministers. Institutional depoliticisation is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some extent from short-term political considerations - vote seeking, populist, short-term pressures to which elected politicians are subject.
[Seite 7] Ministers did, however, enjoy substantial powers in relation to nationalised industries over such issues as appointments, policy frameworks and investment. [Seite 8] First, a distinction needs to be made between an organisation’s theoretical autonomy and the autonomy it enjoys in practice.xv [Seite 10] Depoliticisation should not therefore be seen as necessarily part of the ‘hollowing out’ or evisceration of the state but may be more accurately be interpreted as an aspect of the transformation of the state. Moreover, the degree of true ‘depoliticisation’ is questionable when the independent body operates within a frequently narrow and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers [...] xv Bouckaert, G and Peters, G. ‘What is available and what is missing from the study of quangos?’ in Pollitt, C and Talbot, C. eds. Unbundling Government London : Routledge, 2004. |
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