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Analysis of the European Union’s performance as an international mediator in the South Caucasus with respect to peace building in the region

von Dr. George Danielidze

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[1.] Gd/Fragment 020 01 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:20:19 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 20, Zeilen: 1-18
Quelle: Lynch 2003
Seite(n): 14, 15, Zeilen: 14:2-21; 15:15-22
[As Lynch declares, Civil-military relations are poor in each South Caucasus state, either because the military plays too strong role in politics or because] the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have seen unrest in their armed forces because of the conditions of service and the lack of funding by the government. Relations between the central governments in the capitals and the regions were also troubled. The capital cities have attracted all of the pledged investments, which made the gap with the surrounding regions wide. On a daily level, an individual’s interaction with the state is distinctly predatory: either one has a position/function, in which the resources of the state may be captured for private use, or one has to apply various forms of state rent-seeking behaviour. Lynch says that the institutional weakness of the South Caucasian is a vicious circle: the governments suffer from very low levels of tax collection, which provides little revenue for the provision of public services in health care and education, the latter creates greater public discontent as well as incentives for corruption – all these decrease popular willingness to pay taxes.12

The weakness of the South Caucasian states is evident also in the large proportion of their populations who have left their countries to work abroad as economic migrants. The figures vary between ten to twenty percent of the working population who left mainly for Russia. This trend reflects the lack of professional opportunity available in the region. It may also illustrate a deep-seated perception of illegitimacy of the states that have arisen in the last ten years.13


12 Baev Pavel, Coppieters Bruno, Cornell E. Svante – The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU. Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers No. 65. December 2003. p.14

13 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.15

[Seite 14]

Civil-military relations are poor in each of them, either because the military plays too strong a role in politics or because the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have seen unrest in their armed forces because of the conditions of service and the lack of funding by the government. Relations between the central governments in the capitals and the regions are also troubled. In general, the capital cities have attracted all of the (little) investment that has been made over the last decade, and the gap with the surrounding regions is wide. On a daily level, the individual’s interaction with the state is distinctly predatory: either one has a position/function, in which the resources of the state may be captured for private use or one ends up on the receiving end of various forms of state rent-seeking. The institutional weakness of the South Caucasian is a vicious circle: the governments suffer from very low levels of tax collection, which provides little revenue for the provision of public services in health care and education, which creates greater public discontent as well as incentives for corruption – all of which decrease popular willingness to pay taxes.

[Seite 15]

The weakness of the South Caucasian states (as opposed to nations) is evident also in the large proportion of their populations who have left their countries to work abroad as economic migrants. The figures vary between ten to twenty per cent of the working populations who have left, mainly for Russia. This trend reflects the lack of professional opportunity available in the South Caucasus. It may also illustrate a deep-seated perception of the illegitimacy of the states that have arisen in the last ten years.

Anmerkungen

Auch wenn der Autor zweimal im Text erwähnt und die Aufsatzsammlung, in der der Artikel ursprünglich erschienen ist, in zwei Fußnoten genannt ist, bleiben doch Art und Umfang der Übernahme vollständig ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

[2.] Gd/Fragment 020 24 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:21:29 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Cornell 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

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Quelle: Cornell 2003
Seite(n): 23, Zeilen: 17-26
Crime in the Region

The abovementioned situation in the South Caucasus gave a good ground for crime expansion which is quite multifaceted in the region involving issues posing a mainly economic threat, such as smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes and fuel; but also issues with much wider implications, such as the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, persons and components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The consequences of crime in the South Caucasus affect both the region itself and Europe. Cornell states: as criminal networks entrench their influence over the economic and political elites of the states in the region, they become increasingly powerful actors which have a clearly destabilizing effect on these societies.

The growing threat of transnational crime

[...]

Transnational crime in the South Caucasus is multifaceted, involving issues posing a mainly economic threat, such as the smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes and fuel; but also issues with much wider implications, such as the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, persons and components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 The consequences of crime in the South Caucasus affect both the region itself and Europe. As criminal networks entrench their influence over the economic and political élites of the states in the region, they become increasingly powerful actors in the region, and this has a clearly destabilising effect on these societies.


1. See Cornell Caspian Consulting, ‘The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment’, a report prepared for the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Stockholm, August 2002, pp. 50-2, 60-1.

Anmerkungen

Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben vollständig ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann


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