von George Danielidze
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| [1.] Gd/Fragment 021 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:23:56 Guckar | BauernOpfer, Cornell 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 21, Zeilen: 1ff (komplett) |
Quelle: Cornell 2003 Seite(n): 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 38, Zeilen: 23:28-29.32 - 24:1-3.11-13.16-18.23-24; 25:1-3.12-14.17-20.23-26; 26:7-10; 28:6-16; 38:10-23 |
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| Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, transnational crime has gradually grown in importance in all the former Soviet states. Following Cornell’s analysis, several factors common to those states have made this very rapid growth of transnational organized crime possible. First factor is the weakness of state structures; second, the economic recession that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the failure of the most former Soviet states to generate sustainable economic development; third, the former Soviet space is auspiciously located between the source of illicit drugs, especially the opiates produced in Afghanistan, and their main market – Europe. Moreover, state institutions have proven to be malleable to corruption. Cornell says that in countries such as Georgia or Tajikistan, officials at the highest levels have leading role in organized crime.14
Given the global convergence of separatism and/or extremism with crime, the persistence in the South Caucasus of armed ethnic separatism and uncontrolled territories is a priori a facilitating factor for crime. The links between separatist and extremist political groups on the one hand and transnational crime on the other are plentiful in the region; such groupings typically turn to crime to finance their ideological struggle, no doubt attracted by the large sums of money to be made as well. Cornell gives the instance of the war in Chechnya throughout the 1990s. Chechnya and Dagestan both saw a boom in organized crime, including the smuggling of arms, drugs and other commodities, and abductions of people for ransom. Criminal groups operating in the North Caucasus have spilled over into the South Caucasus, for example in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and also in Azerbaijan, where the influx of Chechen refugees and the proximity to criminalized and troubled Dagestan has facilitated the presence of criminal networks with links to the North Caucasus.15 So, crime is directly connected to the deadlocked armed conflicts of the South Caucasus, which highlights the dangers posed to the international community by separatist ethnic conflicts and resulting state weakness in the region. Breakaway areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have been credibly and directly implicated in transnational criminal activities. Moreover, as Cornell declares, the separatist areas should not shoulder the blame alone. Just as Chechnya would never have become a hub for smuggling in 1991-94 without criminal links to the Russian government; in the same way the separatist regions of the South Caucasus could never have become hotbeds of crime if they were not have been permeated by the same phenomenon. 14 Ditrich Ondrej – New Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus and European Security. Association for International Affairs. Praha 11/2006. pp. 3-4. See also: Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.24 15 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.28 |
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, transnational crime has gradually grown in importance in all former Soviet states. [...] Several factors common to the former Soviet states have [Seite 24] made this very rapid growth of transnational organised crime possible. A first factor is the weakness of state structures. [...] Second, the economic recession that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the failure of most former Soviet states to generate sustainable economic development, limited the venues for legal economic activity – thereby increasing the opportunities for illegal economic activity, and especially organised crime. Third, the former Soviet ‘space’ is auspiciously located between the source of illicit drugs, especially the opiates produced in Afghanistan, and their main market, Europe. Moreover, [...] Fourth, and related to the previous factors, state institutions have proven to be malleable to corruption, and furthermore to direct infiltration by transnational criminal groupings. [Seite 25] In countries such as Georgia or Tajikistan, credible allegations have lingered of officials at the highest levels having leading roles in organised crime. [...] [...] The links between separatist and extremist political groups on the one hand and transnational crime on the other in the region are plentiful, yet the factor of crime in understanding these groupings and their interests is scarcely studied. [...] Such groupings typically turn to crime to finance their ideological struggle, and due to their already underground status as well as their needs they tap the criminal market to obtain weapons. [...] In other words, as the struggle extends in time, parts of the leaderships of ideologically motivated groups tend to turn to crime, no doubt attracted by the large sums of money to be made. [Seite 26] Given the global convergence of separatism and/or extremism with crime, the persistence in the South Caucasus of armed ethnic separatism and uncontrolled territories is a priori a facilitating factor for crime. [Seite 28] Instability in the North Caucasus is another issue that has exacerbated the situation in the South Caucasus, especially the destabilising effect of the war in Chechnya. Throughout the 1990s, Chechnya and Dagestan both saw a boom in organised crime, including the smuggling of arms, drugs and other commodities, and abductions of people for ransom. Criminal groups operating in the North Caucasus have spilled over into the South Caucasus, for example in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and also in Azerbaijan, where the influx of Chechen refugees and the proximity to criminalised and troubled Dagestan has facilitated the presence of criminal networks with links to the North Caucasus. [Seite 38] Crime is directly connected to the deadlocked armed conflicts of the South Caucasus, which highlights the dangers posed to the international community by separatist ethnic conflict and resulting state weakness in the region. Breakaway areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as areas virtually outside state control in practice, such as Adzharia, have been credibly and directly implicated in transnational criminal activities. Moreover, the separatist areas should not shoulder the blame alone. Just as Chechnya would never have become a hub for smuggling in 1991-94 without criminal links to the Russian government, in the same way the separatist regions of the South Caucasus could never have become hotbeds of crime if the recognised states of the region were not permeated by the same phenomenon. |
Die Seite ist im wesentlichen ein Zusammenschnitt von Originalsätzen und -satzfragmenten aus Cornell (2003). Zwar wird Cornell mehrfach im Text genannt, Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben jedoch völlig ungekennzeichnet. |
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Letzte Bearbeitung dieser Seite: durch Benutzer:Guckar, Zeitstempel: 20131216212439