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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 63, Zeilen: 11-22, (22-27) |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 166, 181, 182, Zeilen: 166:1-4; 181:23-28.36-40 - 182.1-2.(3-12) |
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| Besides, the European Commission within the framework of the TACIS program supported the creation of a filter system against drug trade from Afghanistan along the old Silk Road.
A Communication on EU relations with the South Caucasus under the PCA of June 1999 identified the conflicts as the root causes of the region’s political, economic and humanitarian problems. In the Commission’s view, EU assistance could only be effective if two conditions were fulfilled: firstly, if the conflicts were settled; and secondly, if regional cooperation became possible. The EC also recognized that the “effectiveness of EC assistance is directly connected to the development of the peace processes”. However, the member states declared that the PCAs offered the best framework for the transformation of the three states. There would be no strategy, and no political role other than that offered by the PCA framework. As Dov Lynch puts it out – “The GAC (General Affairs Council) recognized that EU assistance would be ineffective without conflict settlement, but refused to create a framework that would actually enhance the prospects for the settlement – the PCAs patently not being enough for these purpose. (…) The EU had entered something of a vicious circle, where the correct analysis was being made but there was no political will to act on its conclusions.”102 102 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.182 |
[Seite 166]
The European Commission, in the framework of its TACIS regional programme, supports the creation of a ‘filter system’ against drug trade from Afghanistan along the Silk Route. [Seite 181] A Communication on EU relations with the South Caucasus under the PCA of June 1999 identified the conflicts as the root causes of the region’s political, economic and humanitarian problems.23 In the Commission’s view, EU assistance could only be effective if two conditions were fulfilled: if the conflicts were settled and if regional cooperation became possible. [...] [...] The GAC also recognised that the ‘effectiveness of EC assistance is directly connected to the development of the peace processes’. However, the member states declared that the PCAs offered the best framework for the transformation of the three states. There [Seite 182] would be no strategy, and no political role other than that offered by the PCA framework. [...] The GAC recognised that EU assistance would be ineffective without conflict settlement, but refused to create a framework that would actually enhance the prospects for their settlement – the PCAs patently not being enough for this purpose. At the same time, the Council called for an emphasis on greater regional cooperation, an objective that was blocked by the non-settlement of the conflicts. The EU had entered something of a vicious circle, where the correct analysis was being made but there was no political will to act on its conclusions. 23. See ‘Bilateral Relations – South Caucasus’, Bulletin EU 6-1999, 1 March 1998. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. Das Zitat wurde nicht in die Zeilenzählung aufgenommen. |
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