6 gesichtete Fragmente: "Verdächtig" oder "Keine Wertung"
| [1.] Gd/Fragment 174 01 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 1. March 2014, 00:32 (Schumann) Erstellt: 2. October 2013, 23:15 Graf Isolan | Evers 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 174, Zeilen: 1-27 |
Quelle: Evers 2003 Seite(n): 44, 45, 46, Zeilen: 44:19-22.28-29.32-33; 45:1-4.12-14.18-20.22-23.24-27; 46:10-12.27-29.29-31 |
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| The South Ossetian Case
South Ossetia is also called Samachablo (by the Georgians) and occupies 3,900 square kilometers. It is situated in the northern part of Georgia and borders North Ossetia, which is one part of Russia. The South Ossetians are of the Orthodox Christian belief. Few of them are Sunni Muslims. The Ossetian language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. The use of the South Ossetian language is declining; the most of the South Ossetians use the Russian one to communicate. A big part of them has a good command of the Georgian language too. The Ossetians see themselves as an autochthon ethnicity and descendants of Scythians and Alans, tribes that were once nomads wandering through the southern parts of today’s Ukraine and Russia as well as the North Caucasus. They believe that the first Ossetian feudal state was formed between the 9th and 13th centuries. With the Mongol invasion in the 13th century, the Ossetians were forced to withdraw to the upper plateaus of the Caucasus. In the 14th century, they began to settle the southern slopes of the mountains again.243 To the contrary, the Georgians are convinced that South Ossetia is one of their oldest historical and spiritual centers and indivisible part of Georgia. They believe that Ossetians are latecomers in the region. In Georgian view, it was first only in the 17th and 18th centuries that the Ossetians began to cross the Caucasian mountains and reside the territory of Georgia. But, as it was in the Abkhazian case, the roots to the conflict are to be found in the beginning of 20th century, starting with invasion of the Russian Red Army in Georgia. On 20 April 1922, South Ossetia was made the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (Oblast) of Georgia. The new soviet constitution of 5 December 1936 confirmed the autonomous status of South Ossetia within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. 243 Evers Frank (Dr.): Mission Information Package South Caucasus. Center for OSCE Research. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. 2003. pp. 44-45 |
[Seite 44]
2. The Conflict over South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) South Ossetia covers an area of 3,900 sq km. It is located in the northern part of Georgia, and is bordered by Georgian districts and by North Ossetia (Alanya) in the Russian Federation. [...] Like their Georgian neighbours, the South Ossetes are of the Orthodox Christian belief. Few of them are Sunni Muslims. [...] The Ossetian language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. [Seite 45] The use of the Ossetian language is declining. There are Ossetian TV channels and newspapers, but the lingua franca in the region is Russian which is spoken and written by most Ossetes. Commonly, South Ossetes have a command of Georgian. [...] The Ossetes call themselves Iron and Ossetia Iriston. They see themselves as autochthon ethnicity and descendants of Scythians and Alans, tribes that were once nomads wandering through the southern parts of today’s Ukraine and Russia as well as the North Caucasus. [...] With the Mongol invasion in the 13th century, the Ossetes were forced to withdraw to the upper plateaus of the Caucasus. In the 14th century, they began to cross the Caucasus mountains again and started to settle in Georgian territory. [...] The Georgians are convinced that South Ossetia is one of their oldest historical and spiritual centres and an indivisible part of Georgia. [...] They believe the Ossetes were, relatively speaking, latecomers to the region. In Georgian view, it was only in the 17th and 18th centuries that the Ossetes began to drift slowly southward from (Russian) North Ossetia southwards to Georgia. [Seite 46] [...] At the end of the day, the present-day conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia appears to have arisen due to Russian dominance, revolutionary changes and Soviet transformations. [...] On 20 April 1922, South Ossetia was made the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (Oblast) of Georgia, which in turn had joined the Federal Socialist Transcaucasus Soviet Republic (12 March 1922). [...] The new Soviet Constitution of 5 December 1936 confirmed the autonomous status of South Ossetia within the newly established Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic. |
Art und Umfang der vielfach wörtlichen Übernahme bleiben vollständig ungekennzeichnet. Kategorisierung unter "Keine Wertung" (wenngleich Bauernopfer), da nicht mehr Teil des Haupttextes. |
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| [2.] Gd/Fragment 175 03 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 1. March 2014, 00:33 (Schumann) Erstellt: 3. October 2013, 00:03 Graf Isolan | Evers 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 175, Zeilen: 3-4, 7-17, 22-25 |
Quelle: Evers 2003 Seite(n): 46, 47, Zeilen: 46:45-46; 47:4-6.7-8.12-13.20-26.28.32-34 |
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| However, the South Ossetians began to openly discuss reunification with North Ossetia. [...]
The Georgian Parliament responded to this by placing restrictive measures on the Ossetian public considerations of independence. On 20 September 1990, South Ossetians replied this fact by declaring independence, and Georgians on their turn responded to the latter by completely abolishing the South Ossetian autonomy on 11 December 1990. In the first days of 1991, around 3,000 - 4,000 Georgian militias entered Tskhinvali, where they – according to Ossetian sources – carried out massacres. The South Ossetians consider this incident as having triggered the conflict, creating tens of thousands of refugees. Georgia’s reason for shifting to armed intervention was obviously that it feared it would lose all control over its already administratively and ethnically divided territory.245 [...] At the Soviet-wide referendum of 17 March 1991, the majority of the South Ossetians voted to maintain and reform the Soviet Union. In April 1991, Georgia declared independence, neglecting minority interests. Military operations were expanded. 245 Evers Frank (Dr.): Mission Information Package South Caucasus. Center for OSCE Research. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. 2003. p. 47 |
[Seite 46]
In the spirit of the late-Soviet zeitgeist and especially due to Georgian calls for independence, the South Ossetes began to openly discuss reunification with North Ossetia. [Seite 47] The Georgian Parliament responded to this by placing restrictive measures on Ossete public considerations of independence. [...] On 20 September 1990, South Ossetes replied to this by declaring independence. [...] [...] The Georgians responded by completely abolishing the South Ossete autonomy on 11 December 1990. [...] In the first days of 1991, Georgian military forces entered Tskhinvali where they – according to Ossete sources – carried out massacres. The South Ossetes saw these incidents as having triggered the conflict, which has yet to be resolved, as well as creating tens of thousands of Georgian refugees. At the Soviet-wide referendum of 17 March 1991, the majority of South Ossetes voted to maintain and reform the Soviet Union. In April 1991, Georgia declared independence. Grossly neglecting minority interests, Georgian policy-makers made greater Georgian nationalism their main goal during that period. [...] Military operations were expanded. [...] Georgia’s reason for shifting to armed intervention was obviously that it feared it would lose all control over its already administratively and ethnically divided territory. |
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| [3.] Gd/Fragment 173 06 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 30. December 2013, 18:57 (Schumann) Erstellt: 22. December 2013, 20:14 Graf Isolan | Evers 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 173, Zeilen: 6-7, 9-11 |
Quelle: Evers 2003 Seite(n): 42, Zeilen: 39-40.42-43.47-48 |
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| According to UNHCR, more than 270.000 IDPs (in the main, ethnic Georgians – Megrels) were forced to leave Abkhazia as a result of the war. The most of them reside in Georgia and are waiting for a return to their homes, which is still a subject of dispute. Abkhazians fear that the resettlement of the IDPs will turn them back into the ethnic minority. The Georgian government has made IDP return a key precondition for starting talks on the status of Abkhazia. | According to UNHCR, more than 270,000 IDPs have left Abkhazia for other Georgian districts. The some 80,000 ethnic Abkhaz, who had earlier constituted merely about a seventh of the total Abkhaz population, now oppose the likely return of their former neighbours. They fear that the resettlement of ethnic Georgian IDPs will turn them back into an ethnic minority in their own country. [...]
The Georgian government has made IDP return a key precondition for starting talks on the status of Abkhazia. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. Kategorisierung unter "Keine Wertung" (wenngleich Verschleierung), da nicht mehr Teil des Haupttextes. |
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| [4.] Gd/Fragment 173 14 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 1. March 2014, 00:19 (Schumann) Erstellt: 29. December 2013, 14:27 Graf Isolan | Evers 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 173, Zeilen: 14-19, 22-24 |
Quelle: Evers 2003 Seite(n): 43, 44, Zeilen: 43:17-21.22-23; 44:12-14 |
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| By December 2001, more than 70% of Abkhazs were granted Russian citizenship. Russia has introduced obligatory visas for Georgian citizens, but the Abkhazs are exempted. Furthermore, the Abkhaz-Russian railway connecting Sokhumi with Sochi was reopened in late 2002, directly violating CIS sanctions. Georgians interpret these facts as direct interventions into their internal affairs by Russia. [...]
The peculiarities of the Russian-Abkhaz border and the Georgian-Abkhaz demarcation line have created favourable conditions for smuggling and other illegal activities. |
[Seite 43]
By December 2001, more than 70 per cent of the Abkhaz people were granted Russian citizenship. Russia has introduced obligatory visas for Georgian citizens, but the Abkhaz and South Ossetes are exempted. Abkhaz-Russian railway line between Sukhumi and Sotchi were reopened in late 2002, directly violating CIS sanctions. [Steps like these have, as a general rule, been reactions to Georgian political decisions.] Georgians interpret them as direct interventions into their internal affairs [and consider this a Russian game in which they play their Abkhaz and South Ossete cards.] [Seite 44] In Abkhazia, the peculiarities of the Russian-Abkhaz border and the Georgian-Abkhaz demarcation line have created favourable conditions for smuggling and other illegal activities. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. Kategorisierung unter "Keine Wertung" (wenngleich Verschleierung), da nicht mehr Teil des Haupttextes. |
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| [5.] Gd/Fragment 176 15 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 30. December 2013, 18:58 (Schumann) Erstellt: 29. December 2013, 14:43 Graf Isolan | Evers 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 176, Zeilen: 15-19 |
Quelle: Evers 2003 Seite(n): 48, Zeilen: 36-41 |
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| The fact that the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict has not been resolved, opened the door to local businessmen to make a profit from the situation. A mixture of smuggling, robbery and kidnapping has become the new pillar of the national economy of South Ossetia. These profitable businesses have created the main obstacles to a peace settlement.252
252 Evers Frank (Dr.): Mission Information Package South Caucasus. Center for OSCE Research. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. 2003. p. 48 |
The fact that the Georgian-South Ossete conflict has not been resolved has given politicians a topic to improve their images. It opens the door to local businessmen to make a profit from the situation. A mixture of smuggling, robbery and kidnapping has become the new pillar of the national economy of South Ossetia. These profitable businesses have created the main obstacles to a peace settlement. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. Kategorisierung unter "Keine Wertung" (wenngleich Bauernopfer), da nicht mehr Teil des Haupttextes. |
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| [6.] Gd/Fragment 177 01 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 30. December 2013, 18:58 (Schumann) Erstellt: 29. December 2013, 14:48 Graf Isolan | Evers 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 177, Zeilen: 1-3 |
Quelle: Evers 2003 Seite(n): 49, Zeilen: 15-18 |
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| There are estimates that about 60 per cent of the residents of South Ossetia have become naturalized Russian citizens; and like the Abkhazs, citizens of South Ossetia do not need visas to enter Russia while Georgians do. | There are estimates that about 60 per cent of the residents of South Ossetia have become naturalized Russian citizens. In any case, like the Abkhaz, citizens of South Ossetia do not need visas to enter Russia. However, the Georgians do. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. Kategorisierung unter "Keine Wertung" (wenngleich Verschleierung), da nicht mehr Teil des Haupttextes. |
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