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Investigative Data Mining: Mathematical Models for Analyzing, Visualizing and Destabilizing Terrorist Networks

von Nasrullah Memon

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[1.] Nm/Fragment 067 02 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2012-04-13 14:40:54 WiseWoman
Arquilla Ronfeldt 2001, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 67, Zeilen: 2-32
Quelle: Arquilla_Ronfeldt_2001
Seite(n): 71, Zeilen: 3ff
Networks with their particular characteristics offer substantial eyecatching choices to terrorists. For example, range, flexibility, low visibility, durability, etc. are well known some of the attractive characteristics.

Networks can often operate clandestinely. The more visible a criminal enterprise the more likely it is to be attacked by law enforcement. It is well known fact that “Networks are not immediately visible”, which is considered strongly by criminal enterprises and can be used to hide behind various licit activities. Those can operate with a lower degree of formality than other types of organization, and can maintain a profile that does not bring them to the attention of law enforcement. In some cases, of course, the network will be exposed. However, in the beginning of the investigation of Mogilevich network by FBI, there was considerable surprise at its extensiveness.

Even when they are targeted by law enforcement, many criminal networks are inherently dispersed, with the result that they do not provide obvious centres of gravity or loci for law enforcement attacks. Lacking a physical substructure or a large investment of sunk costs that would add significantly to their weakness, networks can also migrate easily from zones where risks from law enforcement are maximum to zones where the risks are much lesser.

Criminal networks, especially when they are transnational in character, can exploit differences in national laws and regulations. For example Russian criminals travelled to Israel during 1990’s, which was lacking in money laundering laws and measures. Israel criminalized money laundering in 2000. In some cases, money from Russia was used in Israel to buy up virtually bankrupt businesses that would then start to make “profits” that flowed back to Russia. In some instances transnational criminal organizations also create jurisdictional confusion, making it difficult for any [single nation’s law enforcement agencies to act effectively against them.]

Whatever their precise characteristics, networks provide criminals with diversity, flexibility, low visibility, durability, and the like. Indeed, their attractions are very considerable:
  • Networks can often operate clandestinely. The more visible a criminal enterprise the more likely it is to be attacked by law enforcement. One of the most significant points about networks, however, is that they are not immediately and obviously visible. Criminal networks can hide behind various licit activities, can operate with a lower degree of formality than other types of organization, and can maintain a profile that does not bring them to the attention of law enforcement. In some cases, of course, the network will be exposed. Significantly, though, when the FBI began to investigate the Mogilevich criminal network, there was considerable surprise at its extensiveness.
  • Even when they are targeted by law enforcement, many criminal networks are inherently dispersed, with the result that they do not provide obvious centers of gravity or loci for law enforcement attacks. Lacking a physical infrastructure or a large investment of sunk costs that would add significantly to their vulnerability, networks can also migrate easily from areas where risks from law enforcement are high to areas where the risks are much lower.
  • Criminal networks, especially when they are transnational in character, can exploit differences in national laws and regulations (Israel, for example, only criminalized money laundering in 2000) by engaging in what might be termed jurisdictional arbitrage. Throughout the 1990s, for example, criminals from the former Soviet Union flooded into Israel, exploiting both the law of return and the lack of anti-money laundering measures. In some cases, money from Russia was used in Israel to buy up virtually bankrupt businesses that would then start to make “profits” that flowed back to Russia. In some instances transnational criminal organizations also create jurisdictional confusion, making it difficult for any single nation’s law enforcement agencies to act effectively against them.
Anmerkungen

Somewhat adjusted. Source is not referenced.

In the first sentence "criminals" is replaced by "terrorist" and like that the focus of the section is adapted to what is needed for the thesis. In the third paragraph the American spelling ("center") is anglicized.

Sichter
(Hindemith), WiseWoman



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