Seite: 147, Zeilen: 1-13
|Quelle: Combating Terrorism Center 2006|
Seite(n): 8, Zeilen: p.8,17-18 and p.9,14-19.20-21.23-24.25-26.26-29
|[It is now seen by many as more of a social] movement than coherent organization (Wikotorowicz Q., 2001).
Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack.
In response these and other key losses, Al Qaeda allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize (Joseph Felter et al., 2005).
[...] and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization.
Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” [...]. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, [...] Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, [...] Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, [...] In response to the loss of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network [...][FN 10]
[FN 10] Robert Windrem, 2005.
In spite of some paraphrasing this remains a collage of various bits and pieces of various lengths from the unnamed source from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. Nothing is marked as a citation.
Both sources, (Wikotorowicz Q., 2001) as well as (Joseph Felter et al., 2005) are not to be found in Nm's list of references. However, "Felter et al. 2005" might refer to a version of the source, as "Joe Felter" led its large team of authors.