von Nasrullah Memon, Henrik Legind Larsen, David L. Hicks, and Nicholas Harkiolakis
Statistik und Sichtungsnachweis dieser Seite findet sich am Artikelende
| [1.] Nm6/Fragment 486 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-09 08:58:58 Hindemith | Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, Ressler 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 486, Zeilen: 1-12 |
Quelle: Ressler_2006 Seite(n): 4, Zeilen: 32ff |
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| Despite their strength, researchers’ works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors use limited data sets. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. For example, if one cannot find an Al Qaeda operative in Denmark in publicly available sources, the researcher could assume there is no Al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable that this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional analytical framework. | Despite their many strengths, Krebs’ and Sageman’s works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors are limited in acquiring data. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. If one cannot find an al Qaeda operative in the U.S. in publicly available sources, the researcher could assume there is no al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional analytical framework. |
The source is mentioned two paragraphs further up on the previous page, but without any indication that any text at all has been taken from it. It is given as reference for the sentence: "It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data" |
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| [2.] Nm6/Fragment 486 24 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-09 14:13:54 Hindemith | Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung, Zhao et al 2006 |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 486, Zeilen: 24-30 |
Quelle: Zhao_et_al_2006 Seite(n): 2, Zeilen: l.col: 40ff |
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The iMiner knowledge base consists of various types of entities. Here is an incomplete list of the different entity types:
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The PIT knowledge base consists of various types of entities. Here is an incomplete list of the different entity types:
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The source is not given anywhere in the paper. |
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| [3.] Nm6/Fragment 486 35 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-08 23:13:48 Hindemith | Fragment, Gesichtet, Jacobides 2006, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 486, Zeilen: 35-39, 42-44 |
Quelle: Jacobides 2006 Seite(n): 7, Zeilen: 19ff |
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| Terrorist networks consist of many cells that attend to particular parts of their environment. Hierarchy is used to manage the interdependencies between the different subunits that are not easily resolved through direct interaction [21]. It also resolves issues by flat [sic!], balancing incentives at the sub-organizational level with the interest of (terrorist) network as a whole [22]. [...] It also has the power to change the direction of the organization through substantive decisions on what should be done or through asset allocations [24].
21. Thompson, J.D.: Organizations in Action. McGraw-Hill, New York (1967) 22. Williamson, O.E.: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York (1985) 24. Bower, J.L.: Managing the Resource Allocation Process. Harvard Business School Press, Boston (1974) |
Organizations, as we saw, consist of many specialized sub-entities that attend to particular parts of their environment; [...]
First, hierarchy allows to manage the interdependencies between the different sub-units that are not easily resolvable through direct interaction (cf. Thompson, 1967); it also allows to resolve issues by fiat, thus becoming an arbiter of intra-organizational dispute, balancing incentives at the suborganizational level with the interests of the organization as a whole (Williamson, 1985). Relatedly, hierarchy has the power both to change the direction of an administration or an organization through substantive decisions on “what should be done”, or through asset allocation (Bower, 1976). Bower, J. L. 1974. Managing the resource allocation process. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA. Thompson, J.D. 1967. Organizations in action. McGraw-Hill, New York. Williamson, O.E.. [sic] 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York. |
The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper. The text of the source on the role of hierarchy in general has been taken, including references to the literature, and adapted to the terrorism theme. To be continued: Nm6/Fragment_487_01 |
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Letzte Bearbeitung dieser Seite: durch Benutzer:Hindemith, Zeitstempel: 20140209143933