Fandom

VroniPlag Wiki

Nm6/Fragmente/Gesichtet s

< Nm6

31.388Seiten in
diesem Wiki
Seite hinzufügen
Diskussion0 Teilen

Störung durch Adblocker erkannt!


Wikia ist eine gebührenfreie Seite, die sich durch Werbung finanziert. Benutzer, die Adblocker einsetzen, haben eine modifizierte Ansicht der Seite.

Wikia ist nicht verfügbar, wenn du weitere Modifikationen in dem Adblocker-Programm gemacht hast. Wenn du sie entfernst, dann wird die Seite ohne Probleme geladen.

13 gesichtete, geschützte Fragmente: Plagiat

[1.] Nm6/Fragment 477 18 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 11. February 2014, 01:34 Hindemith
Erstellt: 9. February 2014, 02:36 (Hindemith)
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, Penzar et al 2005, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 477, Zeilen: 18-26
Quelle: Penzar et al 2005
Seite(n): 28, Zeilen: 2ff
After the tragic terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September, 2001, media interest in the Al Qaeda organization rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of Al Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as possible ways for its disruption. One could thus read or hear that Al Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, that “functions as a swarm”, that “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organization”, and that is extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist or counterterrorist methods [1].

1. Penzar, D., Srbljinović, A.: About Modeling of Complex Networks with Applications to Terrorist Group Modeling. J. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 3(1), 27–43 (2005)

After catastrophic terrorist attacks by kidnapped airlines on New York and Washington in September 2001 the interest for al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in public and media rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of al-Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways of its disruption. [...]

One could thus read or hear that al-Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”,that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organisation”, extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist methods.

Anmerkungen

The source is given at the end of the paragraph, but nothing indicates that most of the text is taken verbatim from the source.

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[2.] Nm6/Fragment 479 12 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 11. February 2014, 01:34 Hindemith
Erstellt: 9. February 2014, 02:25 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, KomplettPlagiat, Koschuetzki et al 2005, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

Typus
KomplettPlagiat
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 479, Zeilen: 12-18
Quelle: Koschuetzki et al 2005
Seite(n): 20, Zeilen: 8ff
The degree centrality Cd(v) of a vertex v is simply defined as the degree d(v) of v if the considered graph is undirected. The degree centrality is, e.g., applicable whenever the graph represents something like a voting result. These networks represent a static situation and we are interested in the vertex that has the most direct votes or that can reach most other vertices directly. The degree centrality is a local measure, because the centrality value of a vertex is only determined by the number of its neighbors. The most simple centrality is the degree centrality cD(v) of a vertex v that is simply defined as the degree d(v) of v if the considered graph is undirected. [...] The degree centrality is, e.g., applicable whenever the graph represents something like a voting result. These networks represent a static situation and we are interested in the vertex that has the most direct votes or that can reach most other vertices directly. The degree centrality is a local measure, because the centrality value of a vertex is only determined by the number of its neighbors.
Anmerkungen

The source is not mentioned anywhere.

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[3.] Nm6/Fragment 487 15 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 11. February 2014, 01:34 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 15:58 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, KomplettPlagiat, Nm6, SMWFragment, Saxena et al. 2004, Schutzlevel sysop

Typus
KomplettPlagiat
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 487, Zeilen: 15-18
Quelle: Saxena et al. 2004
Seite(n): 94, Zeilen: 11ff
We are also confident that real-time or near real-time information from a multiplicity of databases could have the potential to generate early warning signals of utility in detecting and deterring terrorist attacks. It is necessary, of course, to have experts in the loop. It has not escaped our notice that SNA, duly validated and used with real-time or near real-time information from a multiplicity of databases could have the potential to generate early warning signals of utility in detecting and deterring terrorist attacks. It is necessary, of course, to have ‘experts’ in the loop.
Anmerkungen

The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper.

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[4.] Nm6/Fragment 478 01 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 9. February 2014, 14:14 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 20:12 (Hindemith)
BauernOpfer, Combating Terrorism Center 2006, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 478, Zeilen: 1-5
Quelle: Combating_Terrorism_Center_2006
Seite(n): 9, Zeilen: 14ff
[Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the] mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack. In response to these and other key losses, Al Qaeda allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize [4].

4. Felter, J., et al.: Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities, pp. 7–9. United States Military Academy, West Point (2006)

Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi. In response to the loss of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network and move its operations out over the entire world.10

10 Robert Windrem, 2005.

Anmerkungen

The source is given at the end of the paragraph, but the extent of the text borrowed from it and the closeness of the text parallel does not become clear from this reference.

The text parallel starts on the previous page: Nm6/Fragment_477_30

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[5.] Nm6/Fragment 477 30 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 9. February 2014, 14:13 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 20:05 (Hindemith)
BauernOpfer, Combating Terrorism Center 2006, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 477, Zeilen: 30-39
Quelle: Combating_Terrorism_Center_2006
Seite(n): 8, 9, Zeilen: 8: 14ff; 9: 14ff
According to many counterterrorism analysts today, Al Qaeda has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks [2]. Since war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded Osama bin Laden’s command and control, Al Qaeda does appear to have become increasingly decentralized. It is now seen by many as more of a social movement than coherent organization [3].

Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the [mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack.]


2. Grier, P.: The New Al Qa’ida: Local Franchiser, Christian Science Monitor (2005) (July 11, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com /2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html (Accessed on May 26, 2006)

3. Wiktorowicz, Q.: The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad. Middle East Policy 8(4), 18–38 (2001)

According to most counterterrorism analysts today, al-Qa’ida has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks.7 Indeed, since the war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded bin Laden’s command and control, al-Qa’ida has become increasingly decentralized, and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization.

[page 9]

Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi.


7 Peter Grier, “The New Al Qa’ida: Local Franchiser,” Christian Science Monitor (11 July 2005). Online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/ 2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html.

Anmerkungen

The source is mentioned only at the end of the paragraph on the next page. See Nm6/Fragment 478 01 The extent of the copied text, including the reference to Grier, does not become clear from that reference.

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[6.] Nm6/Fragment 486 24 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 9. February 2014, 14:13 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 18:38 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung, Zhao et al 2006

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 486, Zeilen: 24-30
Quelle: Zhao_et_al_2006
Seite(n): 2, Zeilen: l.col: 40ff
The iMiner knowledge base consists of various types of entities. Here is an incomplete list of the different entity types:
  • Terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda
  • Terrorists such as Osama Bin Ladin, Ramzi Yousef, etc.
  • Terrorist facilities such as Darunta Training Camp, Khalden Training Camp, etc.
  • Terrorist events/attacks such as 9/11, London 7/7, etc.
The PIT knowledge base consists of various types of entities. Here is an incomplete list of the different entity types:
  • Terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hizballah, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), etc.
  • Terrorists such as Osama bin Ladin, Ramzi Yousef, etc.
  • Terrorist facilities such as Darunta Training Camp, Khalden Training Camp, etc.
  • Terrorist events/attacks such as African embassy bombings of 1998, Madrid Bombings of 2004, etc.
Anmerkungen

The source is not given anywhere in the paper.

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[7.] Nm6/Fragment 478 13 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 9. February 2014, 10:03 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 08:22 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung, Yang et al 2005

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 478, Zeilen: 13-22
Quelle: Yang et al 2005
Seite(n): 2, Zeilen: 8ff
Hierarchy, as one common feature of many real world networks, has attracted special attention in recent years [5] [6] [7] [8]. Hierarchy is one of the key aspects of a theoretical model to capture statistical characteristics of terrorist networks.

In the literature, several concepts are proposed to measure the hierarchy in a network, such as the hierarchical path [7], the scaling law for the clustering coefficients of nodes in a network [5], etc. These measures can tell us of the existence and extent of hierarchy in a network. We address herein the problem of how to construct hidden hierarchy in terrorist networks (which are known as horizontal networks).


5. Ravasz, E., Barabasi, A.L.: Hierarchical Organization in Complex Networks. J. Physical Review E 67, 026112

6. Costa, L.D.F.: Hierarchical Backbone of Complex Networks. Physical Review Lett. 93, 098702 (2004)

7. Trusina, A., Maslov, S., Minnhagen, P., Sneppen, K.: Hierarchy Measures in Complex Networks. Physical Review Lett. 92, 178702

8. Variano, E.A., et al.: Networks Dynamics and Modularity. Physical Review Lett. 92, 188701 (2004)

Hierarchy, as one common feature for many real world networks, attracts special attentions [sic] in recent years [9-12]. [...] Hierarchy is one of the key aspects of a theoretical model [9,13] to capture the statistical characteristics of a large number of real networks, including the metabolic [14,15], the protein interaction [16,17] and some social networks [18-20].

In literature, several concepts are proposed to measure the hierarchy in a network, such as the hierarchical path [10], the scaling law for the clustering coefficients of the nodes [9], the hierarchical components/degree [11], etc. These measures can tell us the existence and the extent of hierarchy in a network. We address herein another problem, that is, how to reconstruct the hierarchical structure in a network.


[9] E. Ravasz and A. -L. Barabasi, Phys. Rev. E 67, 026112(2003).

[10] A. Trusina, S. Maslov, P. Minnhagen and K. Sneppen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 178702(2004).

[11] L. D. F. Costa, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 098702(2004).

[12] E. A. Variano, J. H. McCoy and H. Lipson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92,188701(2004).

[...]

Anmerkungen

The source is not given, although this passage has been taken from it including all references to the literature.

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[8.] Nm6/Fragment 485 13 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 9. February 2014, 08:59 Hindemith
Erstellt: 5. February 2014, 22:26 (Hindemith)
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, Ressler 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 485, Zeilen: 13-31
Quelle: Ressler_2006
Seite(n): 4, 5, Zeilen: 4: 8ff; 5: 1ff
Data collection is difficult for any network analysis because it is difficult to create a complete network. It is not easy to gain information on terrorist networks. It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data [15]. A number of academic researchers [16] [17] [18] focus primarily on data collection on terrorist organizations, analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling.

One promising activity is the development of a major terrorism web portal at the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center. This website makes social network tools and data related to terrorism publicly available. One example is the Terrorism Knowledge Portal [19], a database consisting of over 360,000 terrorism news articles and related Web pages coming from various high-quality terrorism Web sites, major search engines, and news portals. By providing publicly available network tools and data, the research opens itself to a number of new scholars. Academics can double-check the work of others to ensure quality. New scholars can enter the field without the lengthy time commitment and financial cost of developing basic tools and getting data. Such activities, combined with the federal government’s support, will help push the field of terrorism-related social network analysis to new heights in the future.


15. Ressler, S.: Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research (2006)

16. Krebs, V.E.: Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells. Connections 24(3), 43–52 (2002) Detecting Hidden Hierarchy in Terrorist Networks: Some Case Studies 489

17. Sageman, M.: Understanding Terrorist Networks. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia (2004)

18. Rodriquez, J.A.: The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its weakness lies its strength. In: Proc. XXV International Sunbelt Conference, Los Angeles (2005)

19. Reid, E., et al.: Terrorism Knowledge Discovery Project: A Knowledge Discovery Approach to Addressing the Threats of Terrorism. In: Chen, H., Moore, R., Zeng, D.D., Leavitt, J. (eds.) ISI 2004. LNCS, vol. 3073, pp. 125–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

Data collection is difficult for any network analysis because it is hard to create a complete network. It is especially difficult to gain information on terrorist networks. Terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members, and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data. A number of academic researchers focus primarily on data collection on terrorist organizations, analyzing the information through description and straightforward modeling.

[...]

[...] One promising activity is the development of a major terrorism web portal at the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Center. This website makes social network tools and data related to terrorism publicly available.18 One example is the Terrorism

[page 5]

Knowledge Portal, a database consisting of over 360,000 terrorism news articles and related Web pages coming from various high-quality terrorism Web sites, major search engines, and news portals. By providing publicly available network tools and data, the research opens itself to a number of new scholars. Academics can double-check the work of others to ensure quality. New scholars can enter the field without the lengthy time commitment and financial cost of developing basic tools and getting data. Such activities, combined with the federal government’s support, will help push the field of terrorism-related social network analysis to new heights in the future.


18 Edna Reid, Jialun Quin, Wingyan Chung, Jennifer Xu, Yilu Zhou, Rob Schumaker, Marc Sageman, and Hsinchun Chen, “Terrorism Knowledge Discovery Project: A Knowledge Discovery Approach to Address the Threats of Terrorism,” (Working paper, 2004).

Anmerkungen

The source is given, but the reference doesn't give any indication that any text at all has been taken from it. It is given as reference for the insight: "It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data"

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[9.] Nm6/Fragment 486 01 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 9. February 2014, 08:58 Hindemith
Erstellt: 5. February 2014, 22:31 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, Ressler 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 486, Zeilen: 1-12
Quelle: Ressler_2006
Seite(n): 4, Zeilen: 32ff
Despite their strength, researchers’ works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors use limited data sets. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. For example, if one cannot find an Al Qaeda operative in Denmark in publicly available sources, the researcher could assume there is no Al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable that this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional analytical framework. Despite their many strengths, Krebs’ and Sageman’s works have a few key drawbacks. By dealing with open sources, these authors are limited in acquiring data. With open sources, if the author does not have information on terrorists, he or she assumes they do not exist. This can be quite problematic as the data analysis may be misleading. If one cannot find an al Qaeda operative in the U.S. in publicly available sources, the researcher could assume there is no al Qaeda network. However, it is highly probable this is not the case, since terrorists generally try to keep a low profile before committing an attack. The data collectors can also be criticized because their work is more descriptive and lacks complex modeling tools. Fostering relationships with modelers could augment the work being conducted by data collectors, as statistical analysis might be able to take into account some of the limitations of the data and provide an additional analytical framework.
Anmerkungen

The source is mentioned two paragraphs further up on the previous page, but without any indication that any text at all has been taken from it.

It is given as reference for the sentence: "It is a fact that terrorist organizations do not provide information on their members and the government rarely allows researchers to use their intelligence data"

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[10.] Nm6/Fragment 478 44 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 8. February 2014, 23:14 Hindemith
Erstellt: 7. February 2014, 13:17 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Stephenson and Zelen 1989, Verschleierung

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 478, Zeilen: 44-45
Quelle: Stephenson and Zelen 1989
Seite(n): 2, Zeilen: last paragraph
A review of key centrality concepts can be found in the papers by Freeman, et al. [9]. Their work has significantly contributed to the [conceptual clarification and theoretical application of centrality.]

9. Freeman, L.C., Freeman, S.C., Michaelson, A.G.: On Human Social Intelligence. Journal of Social and Biological Structures 11, 415–425 (1988)

A review of key centrality concepts can be found in the papers by Freeman (1979a,b). His work has significantly contributed to the conceptual clarification and theoretical application of centrality.

Freeman, L.C.

1979 a “Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification.” Social Networks I: 215-239.

Anmerkungen

The reference to Freeman et al. is to a different paper, a group work that does not deal with centrality concepts.

Stephenson & Zelen 1989 are not mentioned anywhere in the paper.

To be continued on the next page: Nm6/Fragment_479_03

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[11.] Nm6/Fragment 479 03 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 8. February 2014, 23:14 Hindemith
Erstellt: 7. February 2014, 13:21 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Stephenson and Zelen 1989, Verschleierung

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 479, Zeilen: 3-5
Quelle: Stephenson and Zelen 1989
Seite(n): 3, Zeilen: 1ff
This work was partially motivated by the structural properties of the center of a star graph. The most basic idea of degree centrality in a graph is the adjacency count of its constituent nodes. His development is partially motivated by the structural properties of the center of a star graph. The most basic idea of point centrality in a graph is the adjacency count of its constituent points.
Anmerkungen

The source is not given anywhere in the paper.

The copied text begins on the previous page: Nm6/Fragment_478_44

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[12.] Nm6/Fragment 486 35 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 8. February 2014, 23:13 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 21:22 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Jacobides 2006, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 486, Zeilen: 35-39, 42-44
Quelle: Jacobides 2006
Seite(n): 7, Zeilen: 19ff
Terrorist networks consist of many cells that attend to particular parts of their environment. Hierarchy is used to manage the interdependencies between the different subunits that are not easily resolved through direct interaction [21]. It also resolves issues by flat [sic!], balancing incentives at the sub-organizational level with the interest of (terrorist) network as a whole [22]. [...] It also has the power to change the direction of the organization through substantive decisions on what should be done or through asset allocations [24].

21. Thompson, J.D.: Organizations in Action. McGraw-Hill, New York (1967)

22. Williamson, O.E.: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York (1985)

24. Bower, J.L.: Managing the Resource Allocation Process. Harvard Business School Press, Boston (1974)

Organizations, as we saw, consist of many specialized sub-entities that attend to particular parts of their environment; [...]

First, hierarchy allows to manage the interdependencies between the different sub-units that are not easily resolvable through direct interaction (cf. Thompson, 1967); it also allows to resolve issues by fiat, thus becoming an arbiter of intra-organizational dispute, balancing incentives at the suborganizational level with the interests of the organization as a whole (Williamson, 1985). Relatedly, hierarchy has the power both to change the direction of an administration or an organization through substantive decisions on “what should be done”, or through asset allocation (Bower, 1976).


Bower, J. L. 1974. Managing the resource allocation process. Harvard Business School Press. Boston, MA.

Thompson, J.D. 1967. Organizations in action. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Williamson, O.E.. [sic] 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York.

Anmerkungen

The source is not mentioned anywhere in the paper.

The text of the source on the role of hierarchy in general has been taken, including references to the literature, and adapted to the terrorism theme.

To be continued: Nm6/Fragment_487_01

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

[13.] Nm6/Fragment 487 01 - Diskussion
Bearbeitet: 8. February 2014, 23:13 Hindemith
Erstellt: 6. February 2014, 21:38 (Hindemith)
Fragment, Gesichtet, Jacobides 2006, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung

Typus
Verschleierung
Bearbeiter
Hindemith
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 487, Zeilen: 1-9
Quelle: Jacobides 2006
Seite(n): 7, 8, Zeilen: 7: last lines; 8: 1ff
Hierarchy’s ability to take the role of network (organizational) architect and devise new ways of dividing labour allows a new set of frames to emerge. A new decomposition allows a new set of informational inputs to percolate through the network, and for new views to be formed [25] [26]. This is the cybernetic control function of hierarchy.

Hierarchy can also help to provide some real-time control of terrorist network’s (organization) routine mode of operation, at the level of both actions and cognition. In terms of action, it can step in to block routines that are not functional and override or restructure a proposed course of action to the extent possible.


25. Simon, H.A.: The Architecture of Complexity. Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc. 106, 467–482 (1962)

26. Jacobides, M.: The Architecture and Design of Organizational Capabilities. Indust. Corporate Change 15(1), 115–169 (2006)

Second, hierarchy’s ability to take the role of the “organizational architect”, and devise new ways of breaking up the tasks, and new types of units provides the opportunity for a new set of “frames” to emerge. A new “decomposition”, a new structure leads to a new set of inputs to come through to the

[page 8]

organization, and for new views to be formed (see Simon, 1962; Jacobides, 2006).7 This is the “cybernetic control” function of hierarchy.

Third, there is another important role for hierarchy, and that is to provide real-time control of the organization’s routine mode of operation, at the level of both actions and cognition. Hierarchy, in principle, provides the ability of stepping in (a) to “block” routines that are not functional, and override the proposed or emerging course of action of a part of the organization; [...]


7 [...]


Jacobides, M.G., 2006. The Architecture and Design of Organizational Capabilities, Industrial and Corporate Change 15(1): 151-169.

Simon, H.A.. 1962. The architecture of complexity. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106 467-482.Simon, H.A.. 1962 [1988]. Sciences of the Artificial. MIT Press, Harvard MA.

Anmerkungen

The source is not mentioned anywhere.

The parallel text cannot be found in the mentioned source Jacobides 2006, which is different from the source of the parallel text.

The text parallel begins on the previous page: Nm6/Fragment_486_35

Sichter
(Hindemith) Singulus

Auch bei Fandom

Zufälliges Wiki