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Autor     Svante E. Cornell
Titel    The growing threat of transnational crime
Sammlung    The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU
Herausgeber    EU Institute for Security Studies
Beteiligte    Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, David Darchiashvili, Arman Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla Sagramoso, Brenda Shaffer und Arif Yunusov
Ort    Paris
Datum    Dezember 2003
Nummer    65
Seiten    23-40
Reihe    Chaillot Papers
ISSN    1017-7566
URL    http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp065e.pdf

Literaturverz.   

ja
Fußnoten    ja
Fragmente    3


Fragmente der Quelle:
[1.] Gd/Fragment 020 24 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:21:29 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Cornell 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

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Quelle: Cornell 2003
Seite(n): 23, Zeilen: 17-26
Crime in the Region

The abovementioned situation in the South Caucasus gave a good ground for crime expansion which is quite multifaceted in the region involving issues posing a mainly economic threat, such as smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes and fuel; but also issues with much wider implications, such as the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, persons and components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The consequences of crime in the South Caucasus affect both the region itself and Europe. Cornell states: as criminal networks entrench their influence over the economic and political elites of the states in the region, they become increasingly powerful actors which have a clearly destabilizing effect on these societies.

The growing threat of transnational crime

[...]

Transnational crime in the South Caucasus is multifaceted, involving issues posing a mainly economic threat, such as the smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes and fuel; but also issues with much wider implications, such as the smuggling of narcotics, weapons, persons and components of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 The consequences of crime in the South Caucasus affect both the region itself and Europe. As criminal networks entrench their influence over the economic and political élites of the states in the region, they become increasingly powerful actors in the region, and this has a clearly destabilising effect on these societies.


1. See Cornell Caspian Consulting, ‘The South Caucasus: A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment’, a report prepared for the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Stockholm, August 2002, pp. 50-2, 60-1.

Anmerkungen

Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben vollständig ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

[2.] Gd/Fragment 021 01 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:23:56 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Cornell 2003, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 21, Zeilen: 1ff (komplett)
Quelle: Cornell 2003
Seite(n): 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 38, Zeilen: 23:28-29.32 - 24:1-3.11-13.16-18.23-24; 25:1-3.12-14.17-20.23-26; 26:7-10; 28:6-16; 38:10-23
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, transnational crime has gradually grown in importance in all the former Soviet states. Following Cornell’s analysis, several factors common to those states have made this very rapid growth of transnational organized crime possible. First factor is the weakness of state structures; second, the economic recession that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the failure of the most former Soviet states to generate sustainable economic development; third, the former Soviet space is auspiciously located between the source of illicit drugs, especially the opiates produced in Afghanistan, and their main market – Europe. Moreover, state institutions have proven to be malleable to corruption. Cornell says that in countries such as Georgia or Tajikistan, officials at the highest levels have leading role in organized crime.14

Given the global convergence of separatism and/or extremism with crime, the persistence in the South Caucasus of armed ethnic separatism and uncontrolled territories is a priori a facilitating factor for crime. The links between separatist and extremist political groups on the one hand and transnational crime on the other are plentiful in the region; such groupings typically turn to crime to finance their ideological struggle, no doubt attracted by the large sums of money to be made as well. Cornell gives the instance of the war in Chechnya throughout the 1990s. Chechnya and Dagestan both saw a boom in organized crime, including the smuggling of arms, drugs and other commodities, and abductions of people for ransom. Criminal groups operating in the North Caucasus have spilled over into the South Caucasus, for example in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and also in Azerbaijan, where the influx of Chechen refugees and the proximity to criminalized and troubled Dagestan has facilitated the presence of criminal networks with links to the North Caucasus.15

So, crime is directly connected to the deadlocked armed conflicts of the South Caucasus, which highlights the dangers posed to the international community by separatist ethnic conflicts and resulting state weakness in the region. Breakaway areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have been credibly and directly implicated in transnational criminal activities. Moreover, as Cornell declares, the separatist areas should not shoulder the blame alone. Just as Chechnya would never have become a hub for smuggling in 1991-94 without criminal links to the Russian government; in the same way the separatist regions of the South Caucasus could never have become hotbeds of crime if they were not have been permeated by the same phenomenon.


14 Ditrich Ondrej – New Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus and European Security. Association for International Affairs. Praha 11/2006. pp. 3-4. See also: Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.24

15 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.28

[Seite 23]

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, transnational crime has gradually grown in importance in all former Soviet states. [...] Several factors common to the former Soviet states have

[Seite 24]

made this very rapid growth of transnational organised crime possible.

A first factor is the weakness of state structures. [...]

Second, the economic recession that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the failure of most former Soviet states to generate sustainable economic development, limited the venues for legal economic activity – thereby increasing the opportunities for illegal economic activity, and especially organised crime.

Third, the former Soviet ‘space’ is auspiciously located between the source of illicit drugs, especially the opiates produced in Afghanistan, and their main market, Europe. Moreover, [...]

Fourth, and related to the previous factors, state institutions have proven to be malleable to corruption, and furthermore to direct infiltration by transnational criminal groupings.

[Seite 25]

In countries such as Georgia or Tajikistan, credible allegations have lingered of officials at the highest levels having leading roles in organised crime. [...]

[...]

The links between separatist and extremist political groups on the one hand and transnational crime on the other in the region are plentiful, yet the factor of crime in understanding these groupings and their interests is scarcely studied. [...] Such groupings typically turn to crime to finance their ideological struggle, and due to their already underground status as well as their needs they tap the criminal market to obtain weapons. [...] In other words, as the struggle extends in time, parts of the leaderships of ideologically motivated groups tend to turn to crime, no doubt attracted by the large sums of money to be made.

[Seite 26]

Given the global convergence of separatism and/or extremism with crime, the persistence in the South Caucasus of armed ethnic separatism and uncontrolled territories is a priori a facilitating factor for crime.

[Seite 28]

Instability in the North Caucasus is another issue that has exacerbated the situation in the South Caucasus, especially the destabilising effect of the war in Chechnya. Throughout the 1990s, Chechnya and Dagestan both saw a boom in organised crime, including the smuggling of arms, drugs and other commodities, and abductions of people for ransom. Criminal groups operating in the North Caucasus have spilled over into the South Caucasus, for example in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, and also in Azerbaijan, where the influx of Chechen refugees and the proximity to criminalised and troubled Dagestan has facilitated the presence of criminal networks with links to the North Caucasus.

[Seite 38]

Crime is directly connected to the deadlocked armed conflicts of the South Caucasus, which highlights the dangers posed to the international community by separatist ethnic conflict and resulting state weakness in the region. Breakaway areas such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as areas virtually outside state control in practice, such as Adzharia, have been credibly and directly implicated in transnational criminal activities. Moreover, the separatist areas should not shoulder the blame alone. Just as Chechnya would never have become a hub for smuggling in 1991-94 without criminal links to the Russian government, in the same way the separatist regions of the South Caucasus could never have become hotbeds of crime if the recognised states of the region were not permeated by the same phenomenon.

Anmerkungen

Die Seite ist im wesentlichen ein Zusammenschnitt von Originalsätzen und -satzfragmenten aus Cornell (2003). Zwar wird Cornell mehrfach im Text genannt, Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben jedoch völlig ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

[3.] Gd/Fragment 022 01 - Diskussion
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[At the same time, there is no doubt that the] persistence of unresolved conflicts increases the attractiveness of the South Caucasus for transnational criminal networks. Moreover, crime creates incentives on both sides of the deadlocked conflicts to preserve the status quo, and this is immensely detrimental to most people in the region, but at the same time beneficial to those profiting from crime.

The drug trade is the leading business in transnational organized crime, primarily because it is where the largest profits are made. But, Cornell argues that the drug trade is by no means the only international criminal activity in the Caucasus. The smuggling of small and heavy weapons, as well as materials for WMD, also happens there. The region figures in the North-South direction with the smuggling of arms and WMD components from Russia to the Middle East; in the East-West direction with the smuggling of arms from Asia to Europe; and in the South-North direction with the smuggling of small amounts of sophisticated weaponry to Chechnya.16

Following Cornell, criminal networks also challenge state control over territory. As the example of the Pankisi Gorge illustrates, a lack of control also endangers the Caucasian states’ relations with their neighbours. Crime also influences the effectiveness of foreign, security and aid policies of Western states towards the South Caucasus and is a problem that should be incorporated into those policies in order for them to become effective in achieving their stated aim of improving security and economic development in the region.

The abovementioned simply illustrates how transnational crime could be a potent factor effecting the political and economic future of the South Caucasus.


16 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.35

[Seite 28]

The drug trade is the leading business in transnational organised crime, primarily because it is where the largest profits are made.

[Seite 35]

The drug trade is by no means the only international criminal activity in the Caucasus. The smuggling of small and heavy weapons, as well as materials for WMD, also happens in the region. As with the drug trade, the weakness of law enforcement and the geographic location of the Caucasus combine to make the area an important transhipment point. But unlike the drug trade, the Caucasus figures in the north-south direction, with the smuggling of arms and WMD components from Russia to the Middle East; in the east-west direction, with the smuggling of arms from Asia to Europe; and in the south-north direction, with the smuggling of small amounts of sophisticated weaponry to Chechnya.

[Seite 38]

Criminal networks also challenge state control over territory, as the example of the Pankisi Gorge illustrates, a lack of control that also endangers the Caucasian states’ relations with their neighbours. [...]

[...]

That said, there is no doubt that the persistence of unresolved conflicts increases the attractiveness of the South Caucasus for transnational criminal networks. Moreover, crime creates incentives on both sides of the deadlocked conflicts to preserve the status quo, and this is immensely detrimental to most people in the region but at the same time beneficial to those profiting from crime. [...] Transnational crime also affects the effectiveness of foreign, security and aid policies of Western states towards the South Caucasus and is a problem that should be incorporated into those policies in order for them to become effective in achieving their stated aim of improving security and economic development in the region.

[Seite 39]

While speculative, this simply illustrates how transnational crime could be a potent factor affecting the political and economic future of the South Caucasus.

Anmerkungen

Art und Umfang der Übernahmen bleiben ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

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