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Angaben zur Quelle [Bearbeiten]

Autor     Dov Lynch
Titel    A regional insecurity dynamic
Sammlung    The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU
Herausgeber    EU Institute for Security Studies
Beteiligte    Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, David Darchiashvili, Arman Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla Sagramoso, Brenda Shaffer und Arif Yunusov
Ort    Paris
Datum    Dezember 2003
Nummer    65
Seiten    9-21
Reihe    Chaillot Papers
ISSN    1017-7566
URL    http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp065e.pdf

Literaturverz.   

ja
Fußnoten    ja
Fragmente    2


Fragmente der Quelle:
[1.] Gd/Fragment 019 12 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 22:15:18 Guckar
Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung

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Graf Isolan
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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 19, Zeilen: 12-21, 24-28
Quelle: Lynch 2003
Seite(n): 13, 14, Zeilen: 13:14-29.35-37.39 - 14:1-5
The entities that emerged in the South Caucasus after the Soviet collapse could barely be considered as states. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were recognized by the international community, and assumed the various responsibilities that accompany this process, such as seats in the United Nations General Assembly. But in practice, sovereignty hardly existed within the boundaries of these countries. In the first years following the Soviet collapse, Georgia suffered two conflicts with separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)10 inside its borders, as well as civil war in late 1991. The writ of the Georgian state did not extend far beyond the administrative boundaries of the capital city, Tbilisi, which certainly had no monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Several armed militias vied for power, and parts of the country laid beyond the control of the government. [...]

The South Caucasian countries have come along the way since the early 1990s. Constitutions have been ratified, electoral processes regularized and armed militia groups reigned in. In 2003, the so called Rose Revolution marked the strength of Georgian society as much as the weakness of the state. As Lynch declares, Civil-military relations are poor in each South Caucasus state, either because the military plays too strong role in politics or because [the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces.]


10 To get introduced with short historical overviews and present situations of the conflicts, please see the appendix 2 p.170

[Seite 13]

The entities that emerged from the Soviet collapse could barely be considered ‘states’. Georgia, Armenian and Azerbaijan were recognised by the international community, and assumed the various responsibilities that accompany this process, such as seats in the United Nations General Assembly. In practice, sovereignty hardly existed within the boundaries of these states. Nowhere was this more evident than in Georgia in 1992-93. In the first years following the Soviet collapse, Georgia suffered two conflicts with separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) inside its borders, as well as two quasi-civil wars (in late 1991 and autumn 1993). The writ of the Georgian state did not extend far beyond the administrative boundaries of the capital city, Tbilisi, which certainly had no monopoly over the legitimate use of force, to use Max Weber’s definition of the attributes of the modern state. Several armed militias vied for power, and parts of the country lay beyond the control of the government. [...]

The South Caucasian states have come along way since the early 1990s. Constitutions have been ratified, electoral processes regularised and armed militia groups (for the most part) reined in. [...] The ‘Rose

[Seite 14]

Revolution’ marked the strength of Georgian society as much as the weakness of the state. Civil-military relations are poor in each of them, either because the military plays too strong a role in politics or because the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces.

Anmerkungen

Der Autor der Quelle wird einmal im laufenden Text genannt. Ansonsten erfolgt kein Hinweis auf eine Übernahme.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

[2.] Gd/Fragment 020 01 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:20:19 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop

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Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 20, Zeilen: 1-18
Quelle: Lynch 2003
Seite(n): 14, 15, Zeilen: 14:2-21; 15:15-22
[As Lynch declares, Civil-military relations are poor in each South Caucasus state, either because the military plays too strong role in politics or because] the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have seen unrest in their armed forces because of the conditions of service and the lack of funding by the government. Relations between the central governments in the capitals and the regions were also troubled. The capital cities have attracted all of the pledged investments, which made the gap with the surrounding regions wide. On a daily level, an individual’s interaction with the state is distinctly predatory: either one has a position/function, in which the resources of the state may be captured for private use, or one has to apply various forms of state rent-seeking behaviour. Lynch says that the institutional weakness of the South Caucasian is a vicious circle: the governments suffer from very low levels of tax collection, which provides little revenue for the provision of public services in health care and education, the latter creates greater public discontent as well as incentives for corruption – all these decrease popular willingness to pay taxes.12

The weakness of the South Caucasian states is evident also in the large proportion of their populations who have left their countries to work abroad as economic migrants. The figures vary between ten to twenty percent of the working population who left mainly for Russia. This trend reflects the lack of professional opportunity available in the region. It may also illustrate a deep-seated perception of illegitimacy of the states that have arisen in the last ten years.13


12 Baev Pavel, Coppieters Bruno, Cornell E. Svante – The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU. Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers No. 65. December 2003. p.14

13 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.15

[Seite 14]

Civil-military relations are poor in each of them, either because the military plays too strong a role in politics or because the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia have seen unrest in their armed forces because of the conditions of service and the lack of funding by the government. Relations between the central governments in the capitals and the regions are also troubled. In general, the capital cities have attracted all of the (little) investment that has been made over the last decade, and the gap with the surrounding regions is wide. On a daily level, the individual’s interaction with the state is distinctly predatory: either one has a position/function, in which the resources of the state may be captured for private use or one ends up on the receiving end of various forms of state rent-seeking. The institutional weakness of the South Caucasian is a vicious circle: the governments suffer from very low levels of tax collection, which provides little revenue for the provision of public services in health care and education, which creates greater public discontent as well as incentives for corruption – all of which decrease popular willingness to pay taxes.

[Seite 15]

The weakness of the South Caucasian states (as opposed to nations) is evident also in the large proportion of their populations who have left their countries to work abroad as economic migrants. The figures vary between ten to twenty per cent of the working populations who have left, mainly for Russia. This trend reflects the lack of professional opportunity available in the South Caucasus. It may also illustrate a deep-seated perception of the illegitimacy of the states that have arisen in the last ten years.

Anmerkungen

Auch wenn der Autor zweimal im Text erwähnt und die Aufsatzsammlung, in der der Artikel ursprünglich erschienen ist, in zwei Fußnoten genannt ist, bleiben doch Art und Umfang der Übernahme vollständig ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

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