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Autor     John Roberts
Titel    Energy reserves, pipeline politics and security implications
Sammlung    The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU
Herausgeber    EU Institute for Security Studies
Beteiligte    Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, David Darchiashvili, Arman Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla Sagramoso, Brenda Shaffer und Arif Yunusov
Ort    Paris
Datum    Dezember 2003
Nummer    65
Seiten    91-105
Reihe    Chaillot Papers
ISSN    1017-7566
URL    http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp065e.pdf

Literaturverz.   

ja
Fußnoten    ja
Fragmente    3


Fragmente der Quelle:
[1.] Gd/Fragment 023 11 - Diskussion
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The Caspian is important because it is one of the world’s major producing areas in which actual oil production remains essentially in the hands of market-oriented international energy companies. Its particular importance to Europe is that the most of the additional Caspian oil and gas output is to move westwards to European and Mediterranean markets, although some oil will move by tankers to the giant US East Coast market. The Caspian is important not because it is one of the world’s major producing areas, but because it is likely to become one of the biggest producing areas in the world in which actual oil production remains essentially in the hands of market-oriented international energy companies. Its particular importance to Europe is that most of the additional Caspian oil and gas output is likely to move westwards to European and Mediterranean markets, although some oil will move by tanker to the giant US East Coast market.
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Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme.

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[2.] Gd/Fragment 023 22 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-08 18:54:08 Schumann
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Since, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan secured their independence amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union, only a couple of major new oil and gas pipelines were completed. Among them are: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s 567,000 b/d (barrel per day) system that links Tengiz and Atyrau in Kazakhstan with the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk; the 1.0 mb/d (million barrel per day), $2.95 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which carries oil from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan; the other is its twin: a $1 billion gas line that runs parallel to BTC from Baku to the environs of the Turkish city of Erzurum, where it joins Turkey’s main east-west gas line.20

20 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.92

The 12 years since Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan secured their independence amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union have so far resulted in the completion of just one major new oil pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s 567,000 b/d system that links Tengiz and Atyrau in Kazakhstan with the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. However, official starts have now been made on two more major new pipeline projects, One is the 1.0 mb/d, $2.95 bn Baky-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which will carry Azerbaijani and perhaps Kazakh crude to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, the other is its twin: a $1 bn gasline that will run parallel to BTC from Baky to the environs of the Turkish city of Erzurum, where it will join Turkey’s already built main east-west gasline.
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[3.] Gd/Fragment 024 03 - Diskussion
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As John Roberts indicates, the EU is heavily dependent on energy imports, particularly in oil, but its position is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that well over 20 per cent of its oil imports come from Norway. Overall, in 2000, the EU was dependent on imports (including supplies from Norway) to meet some 75 per cent of its oil requirements. By 2030 it is expected to be 85 per cent dependent on oil imports. According to the European Commission’s Green Paper, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, adopted in November 2000 and published in 2001 - which in places tends to lump Norwegian production in with EU North Sea oil output - the EU anticipates that oil demand will rise from around 12 mb/d (million barrel per day) in 2000 to some 13.2 mb/d in 2030. At the same time, its principal domestic and near-domestic sources of crude oil - the North Sea (including Norway) and internal production in various EU member states - is expected to fall from around 7.0 to 6.0 mb/d. In effect, the EU will move to much the same condition as the United States is in today - reliance on (non-Norwegian) imports to meet around 60 per cent of its oil needs.22

22 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.97

The EU is heavily dependent on energy imports, particularly in oil, but its position is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that well over 20 per cent of its oil imports come from Norway.

Overall, in 2000, the EU was dependent on imports (including supplies from Norway) to meet some 75 per cent of its oil requirements; by 2030 it is expected to be 85 per cent dependent on oil imports. According to the European Commission’s Green Paper, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, adopted in November 2000 and published in 2001 – which in places tends to lump Norwegian production in with EU North Sea oil output – the EU anticipates that oil demand will rise from around 12 mb/d in 2000 to some 13.2 mb/d in 2030.1 At the same time, its principal domestic and near-domestic sources of crude oil – the North Sea (including Norway) and internal production in various EU member states – is expected to fall from around 7.0 to 6.0 mb/d. In effect, the EU will move to much the same condition as the United States is in today – reliance on (non-Norwegian) imports to meet around 60 per cent of its oil needs.


1. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lpi_en.html.

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