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Angaben zur Quelle [Bearbeiten]

Autor     US policy
Titel    The UN, the OSCE and NATO
Sammlung    The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU
Herausgeber    EU Institute for Security Studies
Beteiligte    Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, David Darchiashvili, Arman Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla Sagramoso, Brenda Shaffer und Arif Yunusov
Ort    Paris
Datum    Dezember 2003
Nummer    65
Seiten    53-61
Reihe    Chaillot Papers
ISSN    1017-7566
URL    http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp065e.pdf

Literaturverz.   

ja
Fußnoten    ja
Fragmente    2


Fragmente der Quelle:
[1.] Gd/Fragment 039 10 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 22:18:56 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Shaffer 2003

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
Graf Isolan
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 39, Zeilen: 10-33
Quelle: Shaffer 2003
Seite(n): 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, Zeilen: 53:4-10.28-33; 54:19-25; 55:3-6; 58:7-9.12-15; 59:21-31
As Brenda Schaffer (Diplomatic Academy Vienna) declares, Washington views the US presence and policy in the South Caucasus as a component of its larger Middle East and anti-terrorism policies. Washington has viewed the energy resources of Azerbaijan in two ways: firstly, as a contributor to global oil supply diversification, and secondly, as oil in the margins (an effective tool for lowering oil prices). As to the Armenia-Azeri case, she argues that domestic interest groups, especially the Armenian-American lobby, through influence over Congressional decisions have had a large impact on the formation of current US policy towards the region. At the urging of the American-Armenian lobby, Congress imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan in 1992 in the form of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act that barred direct government-to-government assistance. Following the September 11th, the US administration has waived the Congressional sanctions on Azerbaijan. Many in Azerbaijan felt that the sanctions were waived by the US only in order to take advantage of Azeri airspace and bases concerning the Iraqi crisis and confrontations with Iran.

Here would be also worth to mention that despite the increased activism, US policy towards the region continues to be contradictory and inconsistent due to the often conflicting policy directions of different arms of the US government - mainly the congressional versus the executive branch. For instance, despite the long-standing promotion by US officials of the BTC pipeline, Congressional members who receive considerable support from the American-Armenian community tried to frustrate this project. Moreover, congressionally allocated aid to Armenia is still the highest per capita of all the former Soviet states despite Yerevan’s strong cooperation with states of concern to the United States such as Iran and Syria not to mention the latter’s close relations with Russia. At the same time, the United States joined efforts in the OSCE Minsk Group, which has led the external efforts aimed at resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.57


57 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. pp.53-59

[Seite 53]

As a whole, Washington now views the US presence and policy in this region as a component of its larger Middle East and anti-terrorism policies. In addition, since the late 1990s – especially in the post-11 September 2001 era – the United States has viewed the energy resources of Azerbaijan in two ways: first, as a contributor to global oil supply diversification and second, as oil in the margins (an effective tool for lowering oil prices). [...] Domestic interest groups, especially the Armenian-American lobby, through influence over Congressional decisions have had a large impact on the formation of current US policy towards the region, often in contradiction to policies articulated by agencies of the US executive branch.

[Seite 54]

At the urging of the American-Armenian lobby, Congress imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan in 1992 in the form of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Up until the presidential waiver in 2002, this legislation barred direct government-to-government aid between Washington and Baky and constituted a major constraint on US policy options towards the region.1

[Seite 55]

Additionally, the United States joined efforts in the OSCE Minsk Group, which has led the external efforts aimed at resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

[Seite 58]

Washington’s shift in priorities following 11 September gave the Administration the political will and power to waive the Congressional sanctions on Azerbaijan. [...] Many in Azerbaijan felt that the sanctions were waived only in order for the United States to take advantage of Azerbaijan’s airspace and bases – not as a reflection of a true policy shift.

[Seite 59]

Despite the increased activism, US policy towards the region continues to be contradictory and inconsistent due to the often conflicting policy directions of different arms of the US government – mainly the congressional versus the executive branch. For instance, despite the long-standing promotion by US officials of the BTC pipeline, Congressional members who receive considerable support from the American-Armenian community still try to frustrate this project. Moreover, congressionally allocated aid to Armenia is still the highest per capita of all the former Soviet states, despite Yerevan’s strong cooperation with states of concern to the United States, such as Iran and Syria.


1. Section 907 prohibits US assistance (with the exception of humanitarian assistance and assistance for non-proliferation and disarmament programmes) to the government of Azerbaijan under the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (also known as the Freedom Support Act) ‘until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.’ The legislation imposes sanctions only on Azerbaijan, despite the fact that both Armenia and Azerbaijan waged a war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Anmerkungen

Art und Umfang der weitgehend wörtlichen Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

[2.] Gd/Fragment 040 02 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-18 18:20:09 Guckar
BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Shaffer 2003

Typus
BauernOpfer
Bearbeiter
Graf Isolan
Gesichtet
Yes.png
Untersuchte Arbeit:
Seite: 40, Zeilen: 2-16
Quelle: Shaffer 2003
Seite(n): 54, 55, 57, Zeilen: 54:36-37 - 55:1-3.7-16; 57:1-3
As Schaffer suggests, a strong motivating factor in the US decision to promote the BTC pipeline was the anticipated economic benefits for Turkey as well as the desire to link Turkey to the states of the Caucasus and avoid a crisis in the Bosporus by not increasing tanker traffic from the Caspian region. Washington gave the Republic of Georgia special attention and promoted more cooperation with Tbilisi than with neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan. The special policy towards Tbilisi is motivated by Georgia’s strategic geographic location on the Black Sea, which confers a pivotal role in the region’s development. Moreover, the special treatment of Georgia may have emanated from the fact that relations with Georgia were less controversial from the US domestic perspective than relations with either Armenia or Azerbaijan.

In addition, it can be argued that Washington seemed to support Georgia’s defiant stance towards Moscow directly or indirectly. It is to be mentioned as well, that although Russia’s policies regarding Georgia were an issue of contention between Washington and Moscow, they were not a central point of discussions held on Russia/US summits or other meetings until the Russia-Georgian war of 2008.

[Seite 54]

A strong motivating factor in the US decision to promote the Baky-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was the anticipated economic

[Seite 55]

benefits for Turkey as well as the desire to link Turkey to the states of the Caucasus and avoid a crisis in the Bosphorus by not increasing tanker traffic from the Caspian region. [...]

Washington gave the Republic of Georgia special attention and promoted more cooperation with Tbilisi than with neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan. The special policy towards Tbilisi is motivated by Georgia’s strategic geographic location on the Black Sea, which confers a pivotal role in the region’s developments. Moreover, the special treatment of Georgia may have emanated from the fact that relations with Georgia were less controversial from a US domestic perspective than relations with either Armenia or Azerbaijan. In addition, Washington seemed to support Georgia’s defiant stance towards Moscow.

[Seite 57]

Russia’s policies regarding Georgia were an issue of contention between Washington and Moscow, but were not a central point of discussion in their summits or other meetings.

Anmerkungen

Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet.

Sichter
(Graf Isolan) Schumann

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