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Autor     Dražen Penzar, Armano Srbljinović
Titel    About Modelling of complex networks with applications to terrorist group modelling
Zeitschrift    Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems
Jahr    2005
Jahrgang    3
Nummer    1
Seiten    27-43
ISSN    1334-4676
URL    http://www.indecs.eu/2005/indecs2005-pp27-43.pdf

Literaturverz.   

no
Fußnoten    no
Fragmente    4


Fragmente der Quelle:
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According to Kreb’s (2002) analysis, this network had 62 members in total, of which 19 were kidnapers, and 43 assistants: organizers, couriers, financiers, scouts, representatives, coordinators, counterfeiters, etc. Allen (2004) found that successfully functioning large networks typically comprise 25-80 members, with an optimal size between 45 and 50. A close match exists between the results of Allen’s analysis of collaborating networked groups and this particular example of a terrorist group.

Inspection of this network by standard measures of network structure reveals firstly its low connectedness. A member of this network holds only 4.9 connections with others members on average (also known as degree centrality), which means that average members were rather isolated from the rest of the network. The density (which is defined as the number of actual links divided by the number of possible links) of this network is only 0.08, meaning that only 8% of all possible connections in the network really exist.

According to Krebs’ analysis, this wider network had 62 members in total, of which 19 were kidnappers, and 43 assistants: organisers, couriers, financiers, scouts,

counterfeiters etc. Allen found that successfully functioning large networks typically comprise 25-80 members, with optimal size between 45 and 50. Again, a close match exists between the results of Allen’s analysis of collaborating networked groups and this particular example of a terrorist group.

[Page 34]

Inspection of this network by standard measures of network structure [16 – 18] reveals firstly its low connectedness. A member of this network holds only 4,9 connections with other members on average [En 3], which means that average members are rather isolated from the rest of the network. [...] Connectedness measure [EN 4] of this network is only 0,08, meaning that only 8 % of all possible connections in the network really exist.


[EN 3] This means that average degree of nodes is 4,9, where degree of a node represents the number of links coming out of the node.

[EN 4] Connectedness of a given network is the ratio of actually existing number of links in this network and the maximal number of links that would be possible in a network with the same number of nodes, where each node would be linked to each other.


[16] Krebs, V.E.: An Introduction to Social Network Analysis. 2005, http://www.orgnet.com /sna.html,

[17] Wolfe, A.W.: Applications of Network Models – Glossary to Accompany the Course and the Manuscript. 2001, http://luna.cas.usf.edu /~wolfe/glossary.html,

[18] Borgatti, S.P.: Intra-Organizational Networks. Handouts for the course Introduction to Organizational Behavior, 1996, revised 2002, http://www.analytictech.com /mb021/intranet.htm,

Anmerkungen

There is no reference to the source.

Note, that at the beginning of chapter 3 on page 93, there is a footnote commenting the title of chaper 3. It says:

FN 13: The parts of this chapter are already published in (Memon N, Henrik, L. L. 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d)

However, the source Penzar et al. (2005) has been published before any of those publications.

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In spite of low connectedness, however, the nodes of this network

are relatively close. The average closeness of nodes is 0.35. Betweenness as stated above is another important measure in SNA and it indicates a node’s importance for communication among other nodes. The average betweenness of this network is 0.032, indicating relatively high average redundancy. However the betweenness of 40 nodes is in fact less than 1% and only 6 nodes have betweenness higher than 10%. These 6 nodes are critical for information flow, especially one with betweenness of almost 0.589, meaning that almost 60% of communication paths among other nodes pass through this central node. The node represents Mohamed Atta (node # 33); the leading organizer of the attack whose central position in the network is confirmed by other centrality indicators as well.

Distribution of degrees of nodes (see Section 3.4.1) is particularly interesting. Degrees of nodes are exponentially distributed: the degree of most of the nodes is small, while few nodes have high degree (see Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6).

In spite of the low connectedness, however, nodes of this network are relatively close. [...] the average closeness [EN 5] of nodes is 0,35. Betweenness [FN 6] is another important measure in social network analysis and it indicates a node’s importance for communication among other nodes. The average betweenness of this network is 0,032, indicating relatively high average redundancy. However, betweenness of forty nodes is in fact less than 1 %, and only six nodes have betweenness higher than 10 %. These six nodes are obviously critical for information flow, especially the one with betweenness of almost 60 %, meaning that almost 60 % of communication paths among other nodes pass through this central node. This node represents Mohamed Atta, the leading organiser of the attack whose central position in the network is confirmed by other centrality indicators as well.

[...]

Distribution of degrees of nodes is particularly interesting. Degrees of nodes are exponentially distributed: the degree of most nodes is small, while only few nodes have high degree (Fig. 6).

Anmerkungen

There is no reference to the source.

Note, that at the beginning of chapter 3 on page 93, there is a footnote commenting the title of chaper 3, which says:

FN 13: The parts of this chapter are already published in (Memon N, Henrik, L. L. 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d)

However, the source Penzar et al. (2005) has been published before any of those publications.

Sichter
(Hindemith), Bummelchen

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[This property characterises] the so called scale free networks (Watts, D.J., 2003; Kreisler, H., 2003). Scale free networks (see Section 3.5) form spontaneously, without needing a particular plan or interventions of central authority. Nodes that are members of the network for a longer time, that are better connected with other nodes, and that are more significant for a functioning network, are also more visible to new members, so that the new members spontaneously connect more readily to such nodes than other, relatively marginal ones.

[FIGURE: identical to corresponding figure in Source]

Figure 3.6. Distribution of degree of nodes in the network (see Figure 1.4) of kidnappers and their supporters.

On the pattern of scale free networks, the Al Qaeda’s Training Manual (2001) states: “The cell or cluster methods should be organized in a way that a group is composed of many cells whose members do not know each other, so that if a cell member is caught, other cells would not be affected, and work would proceed [normally”.]

This property characterises the so-called scale-free networks [19, 20; pp.104-111][EN 8], [...]. Scale-free networks form spontaneously, without needing a particular plan or interventions of a central authority. Nodes that are members of the network for a longer time, that are better connected with other nodes, and that are more significant for network’s functioning, are also more visible to new members, so that the new members spontaneously connect more readily to such nodes than to other, relatively marginal ones.

[FIGURE]

Figure 6. Distribution of degrees of nodes in the network of kidnappers and their supporters

[Page 35]

[...] Al-Qaeda’s Training Manual states: “Cell or cluster methods should be adopted by the Organization. It should be composed of many cells whose members do not know one another, so that if a cell member is caught, the other cells would not be affected, and work would proceed normally.” [12; Third Lesson].


[12] Al Qaeda Training Manual. US Department of Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ trainingmanual.htm and http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/network/alqaeda/manual.html,

[18] Borgatti, S.P.: Intra-Organizational Networks. Handouts for the course Introduction to Organizational Behavior, 1996, revised 2002, http://www.analytictech.com/ mb021/intranet.htm,

[19] Li, L.; Anderson, D.; Tanaka R.; Doyle J.C.; Willinger, W.: Towards a Theory of Scale- Free Graphs: Definition, Properties, and Implications. Technical Report CIT-CDS-04-006, Engineering and Applied Sciences Division, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, 2004, http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/ cond-mat/pdf/0501/0501169.pdf,

[20] Watts, D.J.: Six Degrees – The Science of a Connected Age. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2003,

Anmerkungen

There is no reference to the source.

Note, that at the beginning of chapter 3 on page 93, there is a footnote commenting the title of chaper 3. It says:

FN 13: The parts of this chapter are already published in (Memon N, Henrik, L. L. 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d)

However, the source Penzar et al. (2005) has been published before any of those publications.

Sichter
(Hindemith), Bummelchen

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After tragic terrorist attacks by hijacked airlines on New York and

Washington in September 2001 the interest for Al Qaeda in public and media rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of Al Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways of its disruption. Journalists in search of hot topics took over and publicized most of the publicly available materials, often revising them further and making them even more exciting and attractive for wide audiences.

One could thus read or hear that Al Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organization”, extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist or counterterrorist methods.

After catastrophic terrorist attacks by kidnapped airlines on New York and Washington in September 2001 the interest for al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in public and media rose immediately. Experts and analysts all over the world started to offer various explanations of al-Qaeda’s origins, membership recruitment, modes of operation, as well as of possible ways of its disruption. Journalists in search of hot topics took over and publicized most of the publicly available materials, often revising them further and making them even more intriguing and attractive for wide audiences.

One could thus read or hear that al-Qaeda is “a net that contains independent intelligence”, that it “functions as a swarm”, that it “gathers from nowhere and disappears after action”, that it is “an ad hoc network”, “an atypical organisation”, extremely hard to destroy, especially by traditional anti-terrorist methods.

Anmerkungen

Very minor changes. No reference to the source.

Note FN 22 (commenting the title of chapter 5): "The parts of this chapter are already published in Memon N., Larsen Henrik Legind 2006c, 2006d, 2007c and Memon N., Qureshi A.R. (2005)." However, Penzar et al. (2005) has been received in May 2005, Memon & Quereshi (2005) has been published in November,

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