Angaben zur Quelle [Bearbeiten]
| Titel | Harmony and Disharmony - Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities |
| Herausgeber | Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy |
| Ort | West Point, NY, USA |
| Datum | 14. February 2006 |
| Seiten | 116 |
| Anmerkung | An alternative source is the publication: "The Terrorist’s Challenge: Security, Efficiency, Control" by Jacob N. Shapiro (2007) [1] |
| URL | http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21057/Harmony_and_Disharmony-CTC.pdf |
Literaturverz. |
no |
| Fußnoten | no |
| Fragmente | 2 |
| [1.] Nm6/Fragment 477 30 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-09 14:13:58 Hindemith | BauernOpfer, Combating Terrorism Center 2006, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
|
|
|
| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 477, Zeilen: 30-39 |
Quelle: Combating_Terrorism_Center_2006 Seite(n): 8, 9, Zeilen: 8: 14ff; 9: 14ff |
|---|---|
| According to many counterterrorism analysts today, Al Qaeda has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks [2]. Since war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded Osama bin Laden’s command and control, Al Qaeda does appear to have become increasingly decentralized. It is now seen by many as more of a social movement than coherent organization [3].
Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the [mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack.] 2. Grier, P.: The New Al Qa’ida: Local Franchiser, Christian Science Monitor (2005) (July 11, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com /2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html (Accessed on May 26, 2006) 3. Wiktorowicz, Q.: The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad. Middle East Policy 8(4), 18–38 (2001) |
According to most counterterrorism analysts today, al-Qa’ida has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks.7 Indeed, since the war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded bin Laden’s command and control, al-Qa’ida has become increasingly decentralized, and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization.
[page 9] Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi. 7 Peter Grier, “The New Al Qa’ida: Local Franchiser,” Christian Science Monitor (11 July 2005). Online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/ 2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html. |
The source is mentioned only at the end of the paragraph on the next page. See Nm6/Fragment 478 01 The extent of the copied text, including the reference to Grier, does not become clear from that reference. |
|
| [2.] Nm6/Fragment 478 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-09 14:14:02 Hindemith | BauernOpfer, Combating Terrorism Center 2006, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm6, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
|
|
|
| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 478, Zeilen: 1-5 |
Quelle: Combating_Terrorism_Center_2006 Seite(n): 9, Zeilen: 14ff |
|---|---|
| [Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the] mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack. In response to these and other key losses, Al Qaeda allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize [4].
4. Felter, J., et al.: Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities, pp. 7–9. United States Military Academy, West Point (2006) |
Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” who directed training and placement for the group, was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, was captured in Karachi, Pakistan, on the first anniversary of the attacks. These and other counterterrorism successes ultimately led to the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in March 2003. And a month later, Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, was apprehended in Karachi. In response to the loss of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network and move its operations out over the entire world.10
10 Robert Windrem, 2005. |
The source is given at the end of the paragraph, but the extent of the text borrowed from it and the closeness of the text parallel does not become clear from this reference. The text parallel starts on the previous page: Nm6/Fragment_477_30 |
|