Angaben zur Quelle [Bearbeiten]
| Autor | Matthew Flinders, Jim Buller |
| Titel | Depoliticisation, Democracy and Arena-Shifting |
| Ort | Stanford |
| Datum | 1-2. April 2005 |
| Anmerkung | "Paper to be given as part of the SCANCOR/SOG Conference ‘Autonomization of the state: From integrated administrative models to single purpose organizations’" |
| URL | http://www.sog-rc27.org/old_web/Paper/Scancor/Flinders.doc |
Literaturverz. |
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| Fußnoten | ja |
| Fragmente | 4 |
| [1.] Analyse:Nmi/Fragment 099 10 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-10-03 16:21:21 Agrippina1 | BauernOpfer, Flinders Buller 2005, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nmi, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel |
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| 3.2.1 Preference-Shaping Depoliticization
It involves the invocation of preference-shaping through recourse to ideological or rhetorical claims in order to justify a political position that a certain issue or function does, or should, lie beyond the scope of politics or the capacity for state control. In practice, preference-shaping depoliticization tactics involve the construction of a new „reality. in which the role of national politicians is presented as having been, to some extent, eviscerated by external forces or broad societal factors. These forces limit the flexibility of national politicians and reduce their role in managing and enforcing rule-based tactics or policy stances which are designed to alleviate the negative consequences of trends for which national politicians cannot reasonably be held responsible (Flinders, 2007). However, a government may seek to avoid or deflect responsibility for an issue it is possible that the public may still blame the government for non-intervention or the adoption of an inappropriate tactic. The significant aspect of this tactic is that it relies on normative beliefs that may be extremely powerful even though the empirical evidence on which they are based is debated. Governments may seek to espouse or over-emphasise a distinct aspect or interpretation of an ideology in order to increase the potency of the line of reasoning being presented. The preference-shaping tactic is potentially far-reaching in that it attempts to refine and change public expectations about both the capacity of the state and the responsibilities of politicians (Buller and Flinders, 2006). An example of this preference-shaping tactic is the development ensemble.s recourse to arguments concerning globalisation in order to justify certain decisions or non-decisions. |
PREFERENCE SHAPING DEPOLITICISATION
The final form of depoliticisation discussed in this paper involves the invocation of preference-shaping through recourse to ideological or rhetorical claims in order to justify a political position that a certain issue or function does, or should, lie beyond the scope of politics or the capacity for state control. [...] In practice, preference-shaping depoliticisation tactics involve the construction of a new ‘reality’ in which the role of national politicians is presented as having been, to some extent, eviscerated by external forces or broad societal factors. These forces limit the flexibility of national politicians and reduce their role to managing and enforcing rule-based tactics or policy stances which are designed to alleviate the negative consequences of trends for which national politicians cannot reasonably be held responsible. However, although a government may seek to avoid or deflect responsibility for an issue it is possible that the public may still seek to ascribe blame on the government for non-intervention or the adoption of an inappropriate rule-based or institutional depoliticisation tactic. The significant aspect of this [Seite 16] third tactic is that it relies on normative beliefs that may be extremely powerful even though the empirical evidence on which they are based is debated. Governments may seek to espouse or over-emphasise a distinct aspect or interpretation of an ideology in order to increase the potency of the line of reasoning being presented. The preference-shaping tactic is potentially far-reaching in that it attempts to refine and change public expectations about both the capacity of the state and the responsibilities of politicians. It is suggested that an example of this preference-shaping tactic is the Labour Government’s recourse to arguments concerning globalisation in order to justify certain decisions or non-decisions. |
Die Autoren der Quelle sind zweimal genannt, dem Leser wird aber keineswegs klar, dass der gesamte Abschnitt wörtlich übernommen ist. |
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| [2.] Analyse:Nmi/Fragment 100 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-10-03 21:36:26 Schumann | Flinders Buller 2005, Fragment, Gesichtet, KomplettPlagiat, Nmi, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel |
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| In essence, the rhetoric of globalisation has been employed as a tactic or tool through which the potentially negative political consequences of policy choices can be neutralised through the creation of an ideological context in which issues are depicted as being beyond the political control framework of national politics. For example, a government can convince the public that it can no longer control the economy due to wider global trends despite the fact that in reality is still has a number of significant control mechanisms at its disposal. If one emphasises the importance of rhetorical or ideological strategies then this situation may well be defined as one of depoliticization due to the fact that the public believes that depoliticization has occurred because of globalization and other such constraints (Burnham, 2001). | In essence, the rhetoric of globalisation, it has been suggested, has been employed as a tactic or tool through which the potentially negative political consequences of policy choices can be neutralised through the creation of an ideological context in which issues are depicted as being beyond the political control framework of national politics.
[Seite 17] Take, for example, a scenario in which a government convinces the public that it can no longer control the economy due to wider global trends despite the fact that in reality is still has a number of significant control mechanisms at its disposal. If one emphasises the importance of rhetorical or ideological strategies then this situation may well be defined as one of depoliticisation due to the fact that the public believes that depoliticisation has occurred. |
Burnham (2001) wurde nicht überprüft. Sollte sich der Wortlaut auch bei Burnham (2001) finden, dann wäre das Fragment als Bauernopfer einzustufen, denn eine wörtliche Übernahme ist in keinem Fall gekennzeichnet. Die Quelle wird nur am Ende des vorherigen Abschnitts genannt. |
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| [3.] Analyse:Nmi/Fragment 101 17 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-10-03 15:50:46 Agrippina1 | BauernOpfer, Flinders Buller 2005, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nmi, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 101, Zeilen: 17-31 |
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| Institutional depoliticization is possibly the most frequently employed tactic. A formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former (minister) sets broad policy parameters while the latter (chief executive) enjoys day-to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set by ministers. Institutional depoliticization is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some extent from short-term political considerations - vote seeking, populist, short-term pressures to which elected politicians are subject (Buller and Flinders, 2005). Ministers do, however, enjoy substantial powers in relation to nationalised industries over such issues as appointments, policy frameworks and investment. Thus, a distinction needs to be made between an organisation‟s theoretical autonomy and the autonomy it enjoys in practice. Depoliticization should not therefore be seen as necessarily part of the „hollowing out‟ or evisceration of the state but may be more accurately be interpreted as an aspect of the transformation of the state. Moreover, the degree of true „depoliticization‟ is questionable when the independent body operates within a frequently narrow and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers. | Institutional depoliticisation is possibly the most frequently employed tactic. A formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former (minister) sets broad policy parameters while the latter (chief executive) enjoys day-to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set by ministers. Institutional depoliticisation is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some extent from short-term political considerations - vote seeking, populist, short-term pressures to which elected politicians are subject.
[Seite 7] Ministers did, however, enjoy substantial powers in relation to nationalised industries over such issues as appointments, policy frameworks and investment. [Seite 8] First, a distinction needs to be made between an organisation’s theoretical autonomy and the autonomy it enjoys in practice.xv [Seite 10] Depoliticisation should not therefore be seen as necessarily part of the ‘hollowing out’ or evisceration of the state but may be more accurately be interpreted as an aspect of the transformation of the state. Moreover, the degree of true ‘depoliticisation’ is questionable when the independent body operates within a frequently narrow and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers [...] xv Bouckaert, G and Peters, G. ‘What is available and what is missing from the study of quangos?’ in Pollitt, C and Talbot, C. eds. Unbundling Government London : Routledge, 2004. |
Der Verweis macht den Umfang der Übernahmen nicht deutlich. Die wörtlichen Übernahmen sind nicht gekennzeichnet. Fortsetzung auf der nächsten Seite. |
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| [4.] Analyse:Nmi/Fragment 102 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-10-03 16:00:16 Agrippina1 | Flinders Buller 2005, Fragment, Gesichtet, KomplettPlagiat, Nmi, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 102, Zeilen: 1-16 |
Quelle: Flinders Buller 2005 Seite(n): 9, 10, 17, 18, Zeilen: 9: letzte Zeilen, 10: 1ff; 17: 19ff; 18: 1ff |
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| The delegation of functions along a „spectrum of autonomy‟ with ministerial departments at one end and purely private bodies at the other, and executive agencies, non-ministerial departments, non-departmental public bodies, strategic health authorities, a vast range of statutory, non-statutory and „unrecognised‟ bodies, and increasingly complex forms of public-private partnerships in between these two poles - clearly raises a number of conceptual and empirical issues. At which point along the spectrum does an issue actually become depoliticised?
Clearly the explication of such tactics risks over-simplifying the complexity of modern governance. Within any sector at any time it may be possible to identify a mixture or amalgam of tactics. The examples outlined above may not be exhaustive as a list of depoliticization tactics. Nor should they be viewed as mutually exclusive. A government may pursue a number of different depoliticization tactics at any one time; with the preference-shaping tactic providing a macro-political context or rationale; the rule-based tactic operating at the meso-political level and within a certain policy area; and, the institutional tool operating at the meso as well as micro-political level and in response to specific incidents or demands. |
The delegation of functions along a ‘spectrum of autonomy’ - with ministerial departments at one end and
[Seite 10] purely private bodies at the other, and executive agencies, non-ministerial departments, non-departmental public bodies, strategic health authorities, a vast range of statutory, non-statutory and ‘unrecognised’ bodies, and increasingly complex forms of public-private partnerships in between these two poles - clearly raises a number of conceptual and empirical issues.xx At which point along the spectrum does an issue actually become depoliticised? [Seite 17] Clearly the explication of such tactics risks over-simplifying the complexity of modern governance. Within any sector at any time it may be possible to identify a mixture or amalgam of tactics (see Diagram 1). The three examples outlined above may not be exhaustive as a list of depoliticisation tactics. Nor should they be viewed as mutually exclusive. A government may pursue a number of different depoliticisation tactics at any one time; with the preference-shaping tactic providing a macro-political context or rationale; the rule-based tactic operating at the meso-political level and within a certain policy area; and, [Seite 18] the institutional tool operating at the micro-political level and in response to specific incidents or demands (see Diagram 2 for an example). xx Greve, C. Flinders, M. and Van Thiel, S. (1999) ‘Quangos - What’s in a Name? - Defining Quangos from a Comparative Perspective’, Governance, 12, 2, 129-47. |
Ein Quellenverweis findet sich nur auf der Vorseite ohne Bezug zu diesem Abschnitt. Die wörtliche Übernahme ist nicht gekennzeichnet. |
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