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Research on Parliamentary Privilege Concurrently Discuss Chinese National People's Congressional Privilege

von Weizhong Yi

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[1.] Wy/Fragment 172 01 - Diskussion
Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-09-17 18:01:19 WiseWoman
BauernOpfer, Brudney 1999, Fragment, Gesichtet, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Wy

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Seite: 172, Zeilen: 1-13, 101-102
Quelle: Brudney 1999
Seite(n): 7-8, Zeilen: 7:6ff - 8:1-4
There are ample grounds to believe that entrusting congressional selfregulation directly to legislators, or to a process that includes significant participation by legislators, is unworkable. Given the realities of partisan politics, members inevitably will be tempted to depart from a neutral disciplinary approach. Further, regular member recourse to such disciplinary procedures would likely threaten even the modest comity among members that is needed to conduct the legislative process.521 Yet, to the extent that such factors incline members to curtail or impair the use of disciplinary authority, congressional employees understandably will feel chilled in the exercise of their putative rights. Indeed, employees’ diffident assertion of those rights prior to the CAA may well reflect fear of being ignored or retaliated against due to a lack of confidence in the effectiveness or independence of member-controlled enforcement practices.522

13.3.2.2 Key Aspects of the Enacted CAA


521 Robert S.Getz, Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue, Princeton, N.J.Van Nostrand, 1966,pp.84-113.

522 See, James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause and Conflict of Interest Challenges to Uuionzation of Congressional Employees, Harvard Journal on Legislation, Winter, 1999.

[Seite 7]

There are ample grounds to believe that entrusting congressional self-regulation directly to legislators, or to a process that includes significant participation by legislators, is unworkable. Given the realities of partisan politics, members inevitably will be tempted to depart from a neutral disciplinary approach. Further, regular member recourse to such disciplinary procedures would likely threaten even the modest comity among members that is needed to conduct the legislative process.27 Yet, to the extent that such factors incline members to curtail or impair the use of disciplinary authority, congressional employees understandably will feel chilled in the exercise of their putative rights."28 Indeed, employees' diffident assertion of those rights

[Seite 8]

prior to the CAA29 may well reflect fear of being ignored or retaliated against due to a lack of confidence in the effectiveness or independence of member-controlled enforcement practices.30

B. Key Aspects of the CAA as Enacted


27 Cf. ROBERT S. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS: THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ISSUE 84-113 (1966) (discussing similar concerns regarding congressional self-regulation in ethical matters).

28 See, e.g., 1993 Joint Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 125 (statement of Nancy Kingsbury, U.S. General Accounting Office) (reporting that House employees filed a relatively small number of complaints between 1989 and 1993, and that the Office of Fair Employment Practices Director attributed the small number to high employee turnover and employees' concerns about their employing office becoming aware of the complaint); REED & CAMERON, supra note 21, at 37-38 (reporting results of a survey commissioned in the early 1990s by the Joint Committee on Organization of Congress: up to 70% of Senate staff surveyed had reservations about contacting Senate Fair Employment Practices Office to make inquiry or file complaint).

29 See 1993 Joint Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 124 (noting that seven House employees filed formal complaints regarding employment discrimination between 1989 and 1993); CUMULATIVE REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF SENATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, JUNE 1, 1992 THROUGH SEPT. 30, 1994, at 14 (reporting that 28 employees filed formal complaints during the 28-month period). During the early 1990s, there were some 18,000 employees working for the House or Senate as personal staff, committee staff, leadership staff, or staff to Officers of the House or Senate. In addition, nearly 10,000 individuals were employed by Congress's support agencies, including the General Accounting Office, the Congressjonal Research Service, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Capitol Police. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1993-94, 126-27 (1994).

30 See 1994 House Committee Hearings, supra note 24, at 429 (statement of Harold H. Bruf); REED & CAMERON, supra note 21, at 37-38. See also Richard Morrin, Female Aides on Hill: Still Outsiders in Man's World, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1993, at Al (reporting that 80% of female congressional employees would be reluctant to file sexual harassment complaints against members of Congress due to perceived ineffectiveness of current procedures or fear of retaliation).

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Art und Umfang der wörtlichen Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. Auf den detaillierten Fußnotenapparat der Vorlage "verzichtet" Wy allerdings.

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